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Agenda item 99 (l)
General and complete disarmament: implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 6 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward to you a statement by the official spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the "Novichok" chemical agent dated 4 April 2018 (see annex).*

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 99 (l), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vassily **Nebenzia**

* The annex is being circulated in the languages of submission only.

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Annex to the letter dated 6 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: English and Russian]

Statement by the official spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the "Novichok" chemical agent

I would like to draw your attention to online material that has been on the internet for rather a long time but has failed to induce the UK media or the political establishment to start asking questions.

According to Wikileaks, the US and the UK have been actively suppressing international discussion on the now "popular" book on the "Novichok" nerve agent by Vil Mirzayanov, ever since its publication.

As it transpired, in April 2009, Hillary Clinton compiled drew up instructions for a DOS delegation due to attend an Australia Group meeting as a precaution against the eventuality of "Novichok" nerve agent and/or the Mirzayanov book being mentioned during the talks.

The instructions were not a chance occurrence. After Mirzayanov published his book, experts from a number of countries working on chemical weapons problems, including within the OPCW framework, asked the Americans some uncomfortable questions. So, the instructions included five points. It would be a good thing if a State Department spokesperson commented on this information at a briefing.

1. Avoid any substantive discussion of the Mirzayanov book "State secrets: An insider's chronicle of the Russian chemical weapons program" or so-called "Fourth Generation Agents."

2. Report any instances in which the book is raised.

3. Do not initiate or provoke conversations about the book or engage substantively if it comes up in conversation.

4. Express a lack of familiarity with the issue.

(Please remember that these are US State Department instructions for chemical experts, who know about the book and the problem itself and who are going to attend meetings of relevant panels.)

5. Quietly discourage substantive discussions by suggesting that the issue is "best left to experts in the capitals."

On March 28, 2009, not long before the instructions were written, Prague-based US diplomats reported by cable that they had informed their Czech colleagues at the Foreign Ministry that in future, it was undesirable to "publicly discuss next generation agents."

The Czech media have attacked us for constantly mentioning Prague in the context of the Skripal case. We are doing this for a reason, because there are a lot of questions. But Czech citizens should answer these questions, as I see it, for themselves rather than for us. They need to understand what games they have become involved in and are being forced to play. Do the citizens of the Czech Republic understand what is going on in their territory within the framework of NATO-

sponsored research? Do the country's officials and representatives of relevant services have access to research pursued by NATO members on their territory?

These materials are available online. All of this can and must lead to a serious national investigation.

Besides, as is shown by a March 26, 2009 US cable from The Hague, where, incidentally, the OPCW Headquarters is located (earlier this fact was known only to experts, but now, I think, even children know as much), "The UK Ministry of Defense has spoken to its counterparts in the Netherlands and Finland, apprised them of the conversation, and asked each country to provide guidance to its delegates not to raise this issue in future."

All of this is piecing together into a horrible jigsaw puzzle that shows the entire picture of what the world is being dragged into by the Western "grandees," London in this case, behind whose back Washington is looming large.

In the 1990s, intensive research into agents of this type was conducted by the Edgewood Chemical Biological Centre of the US Department of Defense. In 1998, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, an organisation registering all newly synthesised organic compounds, added A-234 spectral characteristics to its database. But by 2000, the entry was deleted, seemingly for reasons of national security.

Nevertheless, the structural formula of "Novichok", which makes it possible for any high-tech chemical laboratory to resynthesise this nerve agent, was first published by Mr. Mirzayanov in his book.

It should be kept in mind that under Clause 1(a) of the Chemical Weapons Convention, each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone.

Thus, the publication of the formula at the initiative of, or with the connivance of the then US administration can be seen as a transfer of knowledge about chemical weapons, that is, an indirect transfer of chemical weapons per se, and, accordingly, as a gross violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. No wonder that the Department of State recommended its staff to avoid the theme.

It is also notable that after the publication of Mirzayanov's "revelatory" book, the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board repeatedly considered the expediency of adding A-234 to the CWC Schedules of Chemicals but invariably came to the conclusion that there was no verifiable data on its existence and it was not feasible to classify it as a warfare agent. British and US scientists, among others, associated themselves with this approach, while drafting the "instructions" that they sent to their experts.

Washington and London reversed their stand only after the March 4 Salisbury incident. As we see it, this U-turn and their unexpected interoperability is just further evidence of the preplanned and provocative nature of these developments.

United Nations A/72/829

General Assembly

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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 14
Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields

Implementation of the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition (2016–2025)

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/259, according to which the Assembly decided to proclaim 2016–2025 the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition, called upon the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) to lead the implementation of the Decade and invited the Secretary-General to inform the Assembly about the implementation of the Decade, on the basis of biennial reports compiled by FAO and WHO.

The report provides an overview of the progress made in implementing the Decade, reflecting key developments at the international, regional and country levels. A work programme for the Decade was developed through an inclusive and collaborative process and efforts to implement the Decade have been actively pursued. Global nutrition targets have yet to be fully achieved but some progress has been made in implementing national commitments. Almost all countries have policies relating to nutrition, often covering all forms of malnutrition. However, nutrition is not always a stated objective in national sectoral policies or development plans. Intersectoral coordination mechanisms have been established to achieve coherent nutrition objectives and targets, often including multiple stakeholders. In general terms, however, implementation should be scaled up, investment in nutrition increased, policy coherence enhanced and the number of national commitments raised. The Decade offers a unique opportunity to accelerate progress on all those fronts.

To assess further progress in implementing the Decade, open and inclusive dialogues between all stakeholders should be arranged at mid-term and at the end of the Decade, in consultation with Member States.

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[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I. Introduction

1. On 1 April 2016, the General Assembly adopted resolution 70/259[1] through which it proclaimed 2016–2025 the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition ("Decade"), called upon FAO and WHO to lead the implementation of the Decade, and invited the Secretary-General to inform the General Assembly about the Decade's implementation on the basis of biennial reports jointly compiled by FAO and WHO.

2. The proclamation of the Decade was recommended at the Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) in November 2014, co-hosted by FAO and WHO, which adopted the Rome Declaration on Nutrition (Rome Declaration)[2] including ten broad policy commitments and its companion Framework for Action (FfA),[3] both of which were endorsed by the General Assembly while declaring the Decade in resolution 70/259.

3. In 2015, the FAO Conference and the World Health Assembly (WHA) also endorsed the ICN2 outcome documents and urged the Membership to implement the commitments set out in the Rome Declaration and the FfA 60 recommendations.

4. With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, world leaders committed to set out a vision for a fairer, more inclusive, prosperous, peaceful and sustainable world in which no one is left behind. The General Assembly acknowledged the ICN2 commitments by including in the 2030 Agenda a specific Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) to "end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture" (SDG2), as well as embedding nutrition-related concerns in the other SDGs.

5. The world is off track to reach the global targets on nutrition. However, prioritized and accelerated action-oriented efforts within the Decade can lead the world to meeting the ICN2 commitments, the 2025 WHA six global nutrition targets,[4] the global diet-related NCD targets,[5] and the many additional nutrition-relevant targets in the 2030 Agenda.

6. In 2016, 815 million people were undernourished globally, up from 777 million in 2015, but lower than the 900 million estimated in 2000. Global stunting, wasting and overweight estimates in children under five were 22.9 per cent (155 million), 7.7 per cent (52 million) and 6.0 per cent (41 million), respectively. Exclusive breastfeeding reached 43 per cent and anaemia in women was 33 per cent. Forty-nine countries reduced stunting since 2012 and 36 reported increase in exclusive breastfeeding. Conversely, overweight in all population groups is increasing and anaemia is not decreasing. In 2016, 124 million children and adolescents aged 5–19 years were obese, and obesity affected 11 per cent of adult men and 15 per cent of adult women.

7. According to WHO estimates,[6] one in 10 people are affected by foodborne diseases every year, with 33 million healthy life years lost and 420,000 deaths annually. Children under five are disproportionately affected and account for 40 per

[1] http://www.undocs.org/A/RES/70/259.
[2] http://www.fao.org/3/a-ml542e.pdf.
[3] http://www.fao.org/3/a-mm215e.pdf.
[4] http://www.who.int/nutrition/global-target-2025/en/.
[5] http://www.who.int/nmh/ncd-tools/definition-targets/en/.
[6] http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/foodborne-diseases/ferg/en/.

cent of the foodborne disease burden and almost a third of all deaths. The highest burden per population was observed in Africa and in South-east Asia.

8. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/259. Informed by inputs contributed by Members and various stakeholders, the report outlines progress made in implementing the Decade, reflecting key developments at international, regional and country levels.

II. Development of a Work Programme for the Decade

9. In resolution 70/259 proclaiming the Decade, the General Assembly mandated FAO and WHO to: (i) co-lead the implementation of the Decade, in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); (ii) develop a work programme for the Decade, using coordination mechanisms such as the United Nations System Standing Committee on Nutrition (UNSCN) and the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), in consultation with other international and regional organizations and platforms; and (iii) produce biennial reports for use by Secretary-General to inform the General Assembly about the Decade's implementation.

10. The aim of the Decade is to provide a clearly defined, time-bound cohesive framework that operates within existing structures and available resources to implement the ICN2 commitments and the nutrition-related SDGs. The added value of the Decade is to establish a focused period to set, track and achieve impact and outcomes, and provide an accessible, transparent and global mechanism for tracking progress and ensuring mutual accountability for the commitments made.

11. The Decade is intended to build on existing efforts, promote alignment among actors and actions, accelerate implementation of commitments, and foster additional commitments in line with the transformative ambitions of ICN2, the SDGs and the WHA targets. The Decade provides an enabling environment such that policies and programmes respect, protect and fulfil human rights obligations and gender requirements. The achievement of the SDGs will only be met when much greater political focus is given towards improving nutrition, as nutrition is both an input and outcome of sustainable development.

12. The Work Programme of the Decade was drawn up in keeping with the guidance given by the General Assembly in resolution 70/259, through an inclusive and collaborative process, which included four face-to-face discussions with Members and two open online consultations. The Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) and the Private Sector Mechanism (PSM) in relations with CFS actively participated in online consultations to help shape the Decade's Work Programme, with participants from 48 countries responding through 189 individual contributions.

13. The Decade's Work Programme[7] embraces six cross-cutting and connected action areas derived from the FfA recommendations, namely:

(a) Sustainable, resilient food systems for healthy diets;

(b) Aligned health systems providing universal coverage of essential nutrition actions;

(c) Social protection and nutrition education;

(d) Trade and investment for improved nutrition;

[7] Full text available at http://www.un.org/nutrition; http://www.who.int/nutrition/decade-of-action/workprogramme-2016to2025/en/; http://www.fao.org/3/a-bs726e.pdf.

(e) Safe and supportive environments for nutrition at all ages;

(f) Strengthened governance and accountability for nutrition.

14. The means of implementation of the Decade through its Work Programme include:

(a) The submission to FAO and WHO by Members and UN organisations of their ICN2 specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART) commitments for action, in the context of national nutrition and nutrition-related policies, and in dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders, tracked through an open access database;

(b) The convening of action networks, i.e. informal coalitions of countries aimed at advocating for the establishment of policies and legislation, allowing the exchange of practices, highlighting successes and providing mutual support to accelerate implementation;

(c) The convening of forums for planning, sharing knowledge, recognizing success, voicing challenges and promoting collaboration;

(d) The mobilization of financial resources to support implementation of national policies and programmes.

15. The commitment submission process will be continuous throughout the Decade. Tracking policy progress and country-specific commitments will be based on country self-assessments, facilitated through UN-led policy surveys, and ad hoc validation studies performed by the UN system and academia.

16. Accountability and shared learning are at the heart of the Decade. A dialogue on accountability, in line with key policy documents on aid effectiveness (Accra Agenda for Action, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness) and the Framework for Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development, is being established, with all relevant initiatives and platforms aimed at soliciting commitments in nutrition and related fields.

17. Progress in achieving the global nutrition and diet-related NCD targets is to be measured throughout the Decade at national and global levels. Targeted programme and policy evaluations should be carried out, with support by the UN system to identify good practices.

18. Evidence-informed advocacy and communication is a key element of the Decade. A visual identity, available in all UN languages, was developed for use across the Decade. Governments and other stakeholders are encouraged to use the Decade's visual identity by submitting an authorization request to the joint FAO/WHO Secretariat.

19. Information on the Decade and its Work Programme is available on a dedicated website,[8] which allows open access to the commitment repository and to other products and activities related to the Decade, such as brief flyers on the establishment of action networks, and country specific SMART commitments. Other communication materials developed include a resource guide on how to define SMART commitments, submit and report on them.

[8] http://www.un.org/nutrition.

III. Global status of policies in the action areas of the Decade's work programme

20. The Second Global Nutrition Policy Review was conducted by WHO in 2016–2017 to assess and analyse the current status of countries' nutrition policies and programmes as well as their implementations. This review provides a baseline for measuring progress under the Decade.

21. Currently 183 countries have national policies that include nutrition goals and actions, of which 168 countries have specific plans on nutrition, 105 countries have health sector plans with nutrition components, and 48 countries have integrated nutrition objectives in their national development plans. Among the 60 United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks analysed, 50 per cent include the WHA global nutrition targets. Over 70 countries worldwide have made efforts in 2014 and 2015 to mainstream food security and nutrition in sectoral policies and investment programmes.[9]

22. Regarding human and institutional capacities, 149 countries have trained nutrition professionals and 109 countries provide training for health workers on maternal and child nutrition.[10] Capacity building has been carried out on nutrition and food safety actions in relation to the implementation of the Decade.

23. More specifically, the following status has been observed in the six action areas of the Decade's Work Programme.[11]

1. Sustainable, resilient food systems for healthy diets

24. Prevention and mitigation of food insecurity risks have been implemented in 57 countries, while 28 countries have applied socio-economic measures that reduce vulnerability and strengthen resilience of communities at risk of threats and crisis. An increasing number of countries are considering incorporating sustainability in their food-based dietary guidelines. Twenty-seven countries are implementing measures to reduce food loss and waste through awareness-raising campaigns, capacity building and evidence-based policies.

25. An alliance for transforming food systems to reduce overweight and obesity in the Latin America and Caribbean region was formed in 2017. Its aim is to analyse the role of current food systems in the emerging overweight situation in this region and to implement a public policy agenda that helps transforming food systems.

26. Policies to reduce the impact of marketing of food and non-alcoholic beverages to children currently exist in 63 countries. About 30 countries use fiscal policies to encourage consumers to make healthier food choices, while 11 countries have improved various aspects of their national food control systems, including legislative and institutional frameworks, as well as technical and scientific capacities to design and implement risk-based food safety management programmes. Moreover, 66 countries have strengthened food safety emergency preparedness and response by engaging with the FAO/WHO International Food Safety Authorities Network. In the framework of the International Health Regulations (IHR) implemented by WHO, food safety constitutes a pillar in the national capacity building and country indicators on food safety have been updated in its Monitoring and Evaluation framework.

[9] http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/global-nutrition-policy-review-2016.pdf; http://www.who.int/nutrition/gina/en/.

[10] http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/global-nutrition-policy-review-2016.pdf.

[11] http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/global-nutrition-policy-review-2016.pdf; http://www.fao.org/3/a-ms430e.pdf.

27. Product reformulation measures (mandatory or voluntary) are being implemented in countries. At least 36 countries[12] have reported that they are implementing measures to reduce and eliminate *trans*-fatty acids in food products either through reformulation or regulation to ban *trans*-fatty acids, and 63 countries[13] have implemented policies to reduce salt intake through reformulation of food products.[14] Moreover, 71 countries have fortified wheat, 106 countries fortified salt with iodine, and 41 countries fortified oils with vitamin A or iodine. The CFS intersessional event on *Impact assessment of policies to support healthy food environments and healthy diets* held in May 2017, highlighted how impact assessment tools provide decision-makers with analysis of the situation and the potential impact of policies on food environments and diets.

2. *Aligned health systems providing universal coverage of essential nutrition actions*

28. The most common interventions delivered through primary health care are counselling on breastfeeding (159 countries) and complementary feeding (144 countries). Other main interventions delivered through health system are iron or iron-folic acid supplementation to pregnant or non-pregnant women of reproductive age (121 countries) and micronutrient supplementation to children under five years of age: vitamin A (76 countries), iron (41 countries), zinc (38 countries), multiple micronutrient powders (52 countries). Deworming programmes were also conducted in 69 countries. In addition, nutrition was integrated into programmes addressing HIV/AIDS in 81 countries and tuberculosis in 67 countries.

3. *Social protection and nutrition education*

29. Nutrition is addressed through social protection in 42 countries, and 38 countries implement conditional cash transfers.

30. Regarding nutrition education, 151 countries have counselling programmes on healthy diets and 148 countries have media campaigns; 153 countries have school health and nutrition programmes, including nutrition education in 94 countries; and 116 countries have developed food-based dietary guidelines. While 121 countries are implementing nutrition labelling, only 35 countries have front-of-pack labelling.[15] Food safety is integrated in nutrition policies in 58 countries, promoting practices such as the *Five Keys to Safer Food*.

31. FAO's programme on rural poverty reduction employs contextualized strategies to support countries to strengthen social protection systems through policy advice, capacity development, information systems and evidence-based knowledge instruments for improving rural livelihoods and strengthening ability of the rural poor to manage risks.

4. *Trade and investment for improved nutrition*

32. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Tariff Download Facility[16] which contains tariff information for some 150 countries, the vast majority of countries have been applying tariffs on imported food and beverage products. However, the applied tariff level varies significantly between countries and many of these may not have a nutrition objective. WTO also maintains the Information

[12] http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/global-nutrition-policy-review-2016.pdf; http://www.fao.org/3/a-ms430e.pdf.

[13] According to WHO Country Capacity Survey, as per NCD Progress Monitor 2017.

[14] http://who.int/ncds/management/best-buys/en/.

[15] http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/global-nutrition-policy-review-2016.pdf; http://www.fao.org/nutrition/education/food-dietary-guidelines/en/.

[16] http://tariffdata.wto.org/Default.aspx?culture=en-US.

Management System on Technical Barriers to Trade[17] as well as the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Information Management System,[18] which contain notifications on various domestic regulations with an impact on trade. About 100 notifications of new or changed nutrition-related regulations were notified during 2016 and 2017.

33. CFS and UNSCN jointly organized a CFS intersessional event in June 2016 on *Trade and Nutrition: Opportunities and Risks* to increase common understanding about healthy diets in the context of trade and value chains. Highlighting the opportunities and constraints in enhancing coherence between trade policy and nutrition action, the event provided insights from various perspectives and experiences that showed the relations between trade and nutrition.

34. At an intersessional event convened by CFS in May 2017 as a contribution to the implementation the Decade, the ICN2 commitments and the 2030 Agenda, five countries shared their approaches to investments in food systems for improved nutrition and human health by providing concrete examples of how different stakeholders have addressed healthier food systems through specific investments in different contexts.

35. The FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission, whose standards are serving as international points of reverence in WTO Agreements, continued to set new food safety and nutrition standards. It established in 2016 a Task force to combat antimicrobial resistance in the food chain.

5. Safe and supportive environments for nutrition at all ages

36. While 129 countries recommend exclusive breastfeeding for 6 months, 100 counties continue to recommend breastfeeding until two years or beyond. However, only 12 per cent of births occur in facilities designated as "Baby-friendly". Whereas 135 countries have enacted legal measures covering some of the provisions of the International Code of Marketing Breast-Milk Substitutes, only 39 countries incorporate all or most of its provisions. Maternity leave cash benefits of at least two thirds of prior earnings for 14 weeks are currently provided in 77 countries.

37. At present 56 countries include in their plans or policies actions to create healthy food environments in the workplace, 35 countries in hospitals and 153 countries in schools, but only 72 countries have clear standards for foods and beverages available in schools. Adolescent girl underweight and/or anaemia is being addressed only in 44 countries.

6. Strengthened governance and accountability for nutrition

38. To achieve coherence in relevant national strategies, policies, plans and programmes, and align national resources to achieve nutrition objectives and targets, intersectoral mechanisms are needed to oversee and monitor implementation and accountability. In 147 countries, one or more intersectoral coordination mechanisms, involving multiple stakeholders, are in place and chaired by Agriculture (in 25 countries), Health (in 103 countries) or the Prime Minister's or President's office (in 38 countries). Such mechanisms include the private sector in 61 countries, which emphasize the need for robust safeguards against conflicts of interest.

[17] http://tbtims.wto.org/.

[18] http://spsims.wto.org/.

IV. Actions triggered by the Decade

1. *Commitments by governments*

39. During the 70th WHA in May 2017, Brazil became the first country to make ambitious, concrete commitments as part of the Decade, with a focus on reversing the obesity trend. The Minister of Health announced three SMART commitments, supported by 41 policy measures, to be achieved by 2019. These were further expanded to 38 commitments at the CFS session in October 2017. Brazil committed to promote sustainable production of and access to nutritious and diverse food and to structuring family farming; promote and protect adequate and healthy eating, control and prevent adverse health conditions arising from poor nourishment (including reducing regular consumption of soft drinks and artificial fruit juices by at least 30 per cent in the adult population, increasing by at least 17.8 per cent the percentage of adults who regularly consume fruit and vegetables and stopping the growth of obesity in the adult population); promote universal access to adequate and nutritious food, prioritizing families and people facing food insecurity and malnutrition, traditional peoples and communities and other vulnerable social groups; scale up water availability and promote healthy diets in diverse environments and at all stages of life; consolidate food security and nutrition governance and support initiatives promoting sovereignty and the human right to adequate food at the international level.[19] Brazil will implement these commitments by 2019.

40. The second country to make specific commitments to the Decade at the 70th WHA was Ecuador. The Vice-Minister of Health announced five commitments, supported by 15 policy measures, with the long-term aim of improving and safeguarding the health and well-being of all Ecuadorians. Ecuador committed to promote environments that promote people's health; promote breastfeeding; provide early comprehensive care to pregnant women, children under five, school age children, with emphasis on health education; promote community participation and intersectoral action.[20] Ecuador will implement these commitments by 2025.

41. In November 2017, at the Global Nutrition Summit held in Milan, Italy, USD 3.4 billion were pledged to tackle the global malnutrition crisis, including USD 640 million in new funding. Importantly, the commitments made included domestic funding by countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, El Salvador, India, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria and Zambia, among others.

2. *Contributions by UN organizations*

42. FAO has mainstreamed nutrition in its Strategic Framework, making nutrition a cross-cutting theme for the Organization, and bringing to the fore the need to focus on food systems as a sustainable way to address malnutrition in all its forms, in line with the Decade and ICN2. Connected to the Decade, ICN2 and SDG2, the FAO Strategy on Climate Change[21] was adopted in July 2017 to guide FAO's action to achieve improved integration of food security and nutrition within the international agenda on climate change, ensuring that food security and nutrition are appropriately prioritized in international forums addressing climate change. FAO provided technical support to over 90 countries with focus on integration of food-based approaches in multi-sectoral nutrition strategies, and of nutrition in agriculture policies and investment plans, school food and nutrition and nutrition education. FAO and WHO are contributing to address the global dietary data gap through the development of the FAO/WHO Global Individual Food Consumption database. FAO

[19] https://extranet.who.int/nutrition/gina/en/commitments/1394.

[20] https://extranet.who.int/nutrition/gina/en/commitments/1421.

[21] http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7175e.pdf.

has reviewed the design of about 50 World Bank agriculture investment programmes in countries to evaluate how their commitment to integrate nutrition in their agricultural investments is progressing. The lessons learnt from this review have been integrated in e-learning modules on nutrition-sensitive agriculture and food systems. FAO has also supported countries and regional economic communities in the formulation and implementation of 18 international trade agreements.[22]

43. WHO has embedded the Decade and included several nutrition indicators in its draft 13th General Programme of Work 2019–2023, and it also has developed a new 2016–2025 nutrition strategy. In 2016–17 WHO developed evidence-informed guidance on healthy diet and effective nutrition interventions, and provided policy and programmatic guidance to nearly 90 countries with focus on successful nutrition policy formulation, guidance on essential nutrition actions, and technical support to measure and report nutrition indicators strengthening surveillance systems. Moreover, 14 countries were supported through workshops on childhood obesity. The WHO Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity put forward six sets of recommendations to accelerate action to prevent obesity throughout the life course.[23] WHO also promoted the evidence-informed nutrition guidance and recommendations to be used in developing and updating nutrition and food labelling standards and guidelines in Codex to ensure Codex work will also take into consideration of increasing problems of the double-burden of malnutrition. Furthermore, WHO has promoted the use of international food safety standards through the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.[24]

44. UNICEF has committed to support the Decade through the implementation of its Strategic Plan 2018–2021. The Strategic Plan reflects UNICEF's new ambition for Maternal and Child Nutrition in support to the 2030 Agenda. UNICEF programmes will be implemented in over 120 countries and will respond to different needs and contexts through five programme areas encompassing 20 context-specific results that will support the action areas of the Decade.[25] In the past 2 years, UNICEF worked to improve the nutrition situation of children, adolescents and women in 127 countries, provided technical and programmatic support to ensure infant feeding counselling services to women in their communities (109 countries), supported legislation to fortify staple cereals with iron and other essential micronutrients (86 countries), and responded to humanitarian situations (78 countries). Over 250 million children aged 6–59 months received two doses of vitamin A, over 35 million adolescents were benefitting from programmes to prevent anaemia and other forms of malnutrition, 10 million children were benefitting from home fortification programmes, and over 3 million children with severe acute malnutrition were admitted for treatment annually. UNICEF released the first ever global report on the quality of complementary foods and feeding for children under two in LMICs, produced over 100 publications in peer review journals, and collected programme coverage data from 110 countries.

45. Investments in nutrition are guided by WFP's new Nutrition Policy (2017–2021), which outlines WFP's global work to support national commitments to achieve SGD targets for ending all forms of malnutrition — including both undernutrition (wasting, stunting, and micronutrient deficiencies) and overweight. While support for nutrition in emergencies remains central to WFP's work, the policy also puts forth an

[22] FAO's contribution to the Nutrition Decade https://www.unscn.org/uploads/web/news/FAO-s-contribution-to-the-Decade.pdf

[23] http://www.who.int/end-childhood-obesity/publications/echo-report/en/

[24] WHO's contribution to the UN Decade of Action on Nutrition (2016-2025) https://www.unscn.org/uploads/web/news/WHO-contribution-to-the-Nutrition-Decade-final.pdf

[25] UNICEF Commits to the Nutrition Decade https://www.unscn.org/uploads/web/news/UNICEF-commits-to-the-Nutrition-Decade.pdf

integrated approach to nutrition by simultaneously considering issues of availability, access, demand and consumption of nutritious foods to achieve the goal of adequate and healthy diets for vulnerable groups of all ages. Throughout the Decade, WFP is committed to working with WHO, UNICEF, FAO, and IFAD and other UN agencies to leverage all available synergies to contribute to collective nutrition results, not only in least-developed countries but universally throughout the world.[26] WFP reaches more than 70 million vulnerable and food-insecure people each year, supporting the development and delivery of national plans and policies to end malnutrition in all its forms.

46. The Strategic Framework 2016–2025 of IFAD articulates its contribution to the 2030 Agenda and is connected to the Decade. As a specialized UN agency and an international financial institution focused on the needs of smallholder farmers and poor rural people, IFAD seeks to improve nutrition by combining solid technical knowledge with the provision of the finance that governments need to make lasting and effective investments in nutrition-sensitive agriculture and rural development. Considering IFAD's comparative advantage, significant contributions to the Decade will be made to sustainable, resilient food systems for healthy diets (action area 1) and to trade and investment for improved nutrition (action area 4).[27] Nutrition is an essential component of IFAD's corporate commitments as articulated in its nutrition action plan (2016–2018). Half (50 per cent) of the projects approved by IFAD as of 2018 are nutrition-sensitive and all (100 per cent) Country Strategic Opportunities Programmes provide a section on nutrition which guides in-country nutrition mainstreaming.

47. The commitments made to the Decade by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) are in line with its core functions of coordination, information management, advocacy, policy and humanitarian funding. More specifically, this includes scaling up global advocacy and campaign efforts in critical situations of acute malnutrition and famine; facilitating access and contributing to enhanced protection; mobilizing resources for improved nutrition in humanitarian contexts; promoting preparedness partnerships and initiatives, and strengthening humanitarian leadership around nutrition as a collective outcome at the country level.[28]

48. UNSCN is doing its part to support the UN "delivering as one" by helping to maximize UN policy coherence and advocacy on nutrition; supporting consistent and accountable delivery by the UN system; exploring new and emerging nutrition-related issues; and promoting knowledge sharing across the UN system. For the Decade to achieve longstanding results, forward thinking and adaptively to the constantly evolving nutrition landscape is essential. UNSCN is working to push the research community to come forward and fill these knowledge gaps. UNSCN also builds bridges between the intergovernmental decision-making forums of its members, as part of its effort to engage in all relevant forums to ensure that nutrition is mainstreamed. The UNSCN paper *Global Governance for Nutrition and the role of UNSCN* provides a detailed overview of the actors involved in the nutrition landscape. The *Guidance Note on Integration of Nutrition in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework* serves to better equip UN Country Teams to integrate nutrition into their planning and programming, and to reflect nutrition-related risks and opportunities in the Common Country Analysis. The flagship publication entitled *A*

[26] WFP and the Nutrition Decade. https://www.unscn.org/uploads/web/news/WFP-and-the-Decade-of-Action-on-Nutrition-Final.pdf.

[27] IFAD and the Nutrition Decade. https://www.unscn.org/uploads/web/news/IFAD-and-the-Decade-of-Action-on-Nutrition.pdf.

[28] OCHA's Commitment Summary. https://www.unscn.org/uploads/web/news/DECADE-COMMITMENTS.pdf.

Spotlight on the Nutrition Decade as UNSCN News 42[29] illustrates in a series of papers how the Decade provides a window of opportunity to drive integrated action across multiple sectors and to enhance coordination amongst all actors for improved nutrition.

49. The UN Inter-agency Task Force on Noncommunicable Diseases (UNIATF) started in 2016 a thematic working group on nutrition, coordinated by UNSCN. The group focuses on improving policy coherence, specifically related to the food environment, a space in which consumers make their dietary choices and is heavily influenced by a large range of actors and factors (trade, labelling, prices, processing etc.). The group also intends to integrate nutrition considerations in other areas of work of the Task Force (e.g. environment, physical activity). Ending childhood obesity through action in the school environment is an early focus for the group, which will also provide input to the 3rd High-level Meeting on NCDs in 2018.

3. *Contributions by non-state actors*

50. The dynamic involvement of civil society and private sector representatives, especially through the CSM and PSM, has added value to the consultations conducted around the Decade, and their various contributions have been captured in the UNSCN publication *A Spotlight on the Nutrition Decade*.

51. In addition, individual members from the CSM and PSM have started to make their SMART commitments official. Since these commitments are in support of government priorities on nutrition, they are also encouraging their country teams to use their commitments as engagement tools to persuade national governments to make theirs. For example, a platform of public interest civil society organizations and social movements that have actively engaged in the ICN2 process and continue to advance its follow-up has also submitted a collective position "Manifesto" to highlight the principles on which the Decade should evolve, their expectations and how they will be engaged.[30] The World Obesity Federation has prioritized addressing marketing of foods to children that are high in fat, sugar and/or salt, making cities healthier and providing treatment for obesity.

4. *Multistakeholder initiatives*

52. The membership of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement currently comprises 60 countries, and three Indian States. A new SUN Strategy was developed for 2016–2020, with a vision of "a world free from all forms of malnutrition" by 2030, which is aligned to the WHA six global nutrition targets and two diet-related NCD targets. The Strategy focuses on supporting SUN member countries to sustain an enabling political environment, prioritise and implement effective nutrition actions aligned with a common set of results. From 7 to 9 November 2017, the SUN Global Gathering was organized for the first time in a SUN country: Côte d'Ivoire. About 900 participants from all 60 SUN countries and the different networks reviewed progress in tackling malnutrition and shared innovations and good practices.

53. Networks of stakeholders supporting the SUN Movement are broadening. The UN Network for SUN (UNN) increases UN coherence, coordination and convergence in support of national nutrition efforts, builds capacity for multi-sectoral nutrition governance and programmes and supports the functioning of multi-stakeholder coordination platforms. In 2016, the UNN had over 700 staff dedicated to nutrition

[29] https://www.unscn.org/uploads/web/news/UNSCN-News42-2017.pdf.

[30] Civil Society "Manifesto" on Decade of Action on Nutrition. https://www.unscn.org/uploads/web/news/EN-Civil-Society-Manifesto-on-DoA-on-Nutrition-Advanced-Draft.pdf.

across all SUN countries, the majority being national staff. The UNN supports all action areas of the Decade, including SMART target setting.

54. The Sustainable Food Systems (SFS) Programme of the 10-Year Framework for Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns (10YFP) is a multi-stakeholder initiative to accelerate the shift towards more sustainable food systems. Work is on-going to integrate nutrition and NCDs in 10YFP SFS project proposals, making the link between sustainable production and sustainable and healthy consumption.

5. Action networks

55. Norway announced, at the Ocean Conference in June 2017, the establishment of a *Global Action Network on Sustainable Food from the Oceans and Inland Waters for Food Security and Nutrition*,[31] under the umbrella of the Decade and as a direct follow-up to the SDGs. The Norwegian Government invited interested countries to join this Action Network by giving higher priority to fisheries and aquaculture to improve global food security and nutrition, considering the ocean's potential to supply a substantial part of the world's future need for food.

56. Two additional regional networks were announced at the Global Conference on NCDs held in Montevideo, Uruguay, in October 2017: the *Action Network for the Americas on Healthy Food Environments*, led by Chile, and the *Action Network for Ending Childhood Obesity in the Pacific*, hosted by Fiji. The focus of work of these networks includes advancing and sharing experiences in: the fiscal interventions on sugar-sweetened beverages, front-of-pack labelling, restriction on the marketing of foods and non-alcoholic beverages to children, and provision and promotion of healthy diets in schools and other settings where children gather. Both these networks have held preliminary working group meetings to identify priority activities for the next two years and define network membership and governance. The Conference endorsed the *Montevideo Roadmap 2018-2030 on NCDs as a Sustainable Development Priority*,[32] pledging in particular to developing guidelines and recommendations that support and encourage healthy and sustainable diets.

57. In 2016 the *Food Networks' Alliance* was set up under the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (MUFPP). Adopted in 2015 and signed by over 160 cities worldwide, the MUFPP is a joint commitment by cities that aims to develop sustainable food systems at the city level that provide nutritious, diverse and affordable food to all people, thereby contributing to achieving the ICN2 commitments, the SDG health and nutrition targets and the aims of the Decade. The Alliance seeks to foster collaboration among national, regional and international city networks and serves as a hub for information sharing among. Examples of such networks include: the *Food Systems Network* of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group; *EUROCITIES*, the network of major European cities; and *Healthy Cities*, Italy's network of WHO cities.

58. As called for by the SAMOA Pathway,[33] FAO, together with UNDESA and the Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States has led the development of the *Global Action Programme on Food Security and Nutrition in SIDS* (GAP),[34] which was launched at the FAO Conference in July 2017. Making explicit references to ICN2, SDG2 and the Decade, the GAP is a guidance document intended to promote coordinated interventions of governments, private sector, civil society, international

[31] https://nettsteder.regjeringen.no/foodfromtheocean/action-network/.

[32] http://www.who.int/conferences/global-ncd-conference/Roadmap.pdf?ua=1.

[33] http://www.undocs.org/A/CONF.233/10.

[34] www.fao.org/3/a-i7297e.pdf.

organizations and other development partners to accelerate action to halt and reverse the growing food security and nutrition crises in a comprehensive manner.

V. Promotion and advocacy on the action areas of the Decade's Work Programme

59. Queen Letizia of Spain and King Letsie III of Lesotho were nominated as UN *Special Ambassadors for Nutrition* to raise awareness of malnutrition challenges and build support for improved nutrition stemming from ICN2 and the Decade. Other efforts aimed at tackling malnutrition in the context of the Decade include forums and conferences, reports and publications, resolutions and recommendations.

1. Forums and conferences

60. In October 2016, CFS decided to scale up its role in advancing nutrition. To this end, it endorsed a framework to step up its contribution to the global fight against malnutrition in all its forms, serving as an intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder global forum on nutrition, in line with its mandate.[35]

61. In October 2017, CFS reaffirmed its decision to expand its nutrition work, providing a platform for global coordination and policy coherence and convergence on nutrition, in accordance with the Decade's Work Programme, and mandated its Open-ended Working Group on Nutrition to develop voluntary guidelines for food systems and nutrition in 2019,[36] based on the 2017 report on *Nutrition and Food Systems*,[37] produced by the CFS High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE). This report requested CFS to consider elaborating voluntary guidelines on improved food environments for healthy diets.

62. In December 2016, FAO and WHO co-hosted in Rome the *International Symposium on Sustainable Food Systems for Healthy Diets and Improved Nutrition*. Its focus was on supply-side and demand-side policies and measures for increasing access to healthy diets, empowering consumers to choose healthy diets and measures to strengthen accountability, resilience and equity within the food system. The Symposium fostered collaboration between governments and other stakeholders in developing innovative solutions to enable food systems to deliver healthy diets for better nutrition and health. During the final session, the draft Work Programme of the Decade was discussed, and expressions of SMART commitments and new ways of working together to seize the opportunity presented by the Decade were made by country delegates and other key stakeholders.

63. Intended to provide a vision for regional contexts and realities, five regional symposia[38] took stock of their dimensions and challenges of sustainable food systems for healthy diets and improved nutrition; shared key features of food systems in the respective regions, and how these influence dietary patterns; identified regional policy processes and experiences for tackling nutrition through a food systems

[35] *CFS Engagement in Advancing Nutrition*, CFS 2016/43/9.

[36] CFS 2017/44.

[37] HLPE, *Nutrition and Food Systems*, Rome, 2017– www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/hlpe/hlpe_documents/HLPE_Reports/HLPE-Report-12_EN.pdf.

[38] For Latin America and the Caribbean (San Salvador, 5–7 September 2017), for Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok, 10–11 November 2017), for Africa (Abidjan, 16–17 November 2017), for Europe and Central Asia (Budapest, 4–5 December 2017) and for the Near East and North Africa (Muscat, 11–12 December 2017).

approach; and triggered the development of policy actions in line with the ICN2 FfA and the Decade's Work Programme.

64. The *Latin America Regional Meeting for Tackling Child Obesity — Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition*, convened by Brazil and hosted by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in March 2017, encouraged countries of the region to engage in active coordination for the Decade's implementation, with particular focus on childhood obesity. Participating countries presented their ideas to develop SMART commitments, building on their national plans, and discussed potential mechanisms for cooperation, such as country-led action networks.

65. In preparation for the 2017 High-level Political Forum (HLPF), the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), FAO, IFAD and WFP organized an expert group meeting on progress in achieving SDG2 in June 2017 in New York. The meeting reaffirmed that a crucial change necessary to reach SDG2 is to transform food systems through a holistic approach, from production to consumption, so that they are more sustainable, inclusive and resilient to climate change, and support the production, access and consumption of safe and nutritious food. SMART policy and financial commitments made under the umbrella of the Decade will be key to the achievement of SDG2.

66. In July 2017, the FAO Conference adopted a resolution to transmit, together with WHO, a proposal to the UN General Assembly to declare 7 June each year as World Food Safety Day.

67. At its 2017 session, the HLPF resulted in a ministerial declaration on *Eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions through promoting sustainable development, expanding opportunities and addressing related challenges*,[39] underlying that poverty remains a principal cause of hunger, emphasizing that investment in health contributes to the eradication of poverty, hunger and malnutrition, and committing to "ending poverty and hunger and ensuring healthy lives at all ages everywhere". A *Synthesis of voluntary submissions by functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council and other intergovernmental bodies and forums* was presented at the 2016 and 2017 sessions of the HLPF.[40] These reports serve the Decade by highlighting that malnutrition has overtaken hunger in terms of the numbers of people affected worldwide, that it is linked closely to inequality and the sustainability of food systems, and that complex political, economic, social and environmental factors are involved in combating it. Mainstreaming nutrition into all agricultural development policies and strategies is therefore needed, and addressing health system weaknesses is of the utmost importance.

68. The *Sub-regional meeting for tackling obesity in middle income countries of the WHO Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO) Region — Towards more commitment for the Decade of Action on Nutrition* that took place in Amman, Jordan, in September 2017, brought together seven countries from the region to discuss and plan their priority actions for reducing child obesity as well as SMART commitments in the context of the Decade.

69. The WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific, in October 2017, agreed to develop a regional action plan, in close consultation with its Member States, on protecting children from the harmful impact of food marketing, guided by relevant WHA resolutions, including on ICN2 and the Decade[41].

[39] E/2017/L.29-E/HLPF/2017/L.2.

[40] E/HLPF/2016/5 and E/HLPF/2017/3.

[41] http://www.wpro.who.int/about/regional_committee/68/resolutions/wpr_rc68_r3_protecting_children_from_thehharmful_impact_of_food_marketing.pdf.

70. On 4 November 2017, in connection with the G7 Health Ministers' Meeting, the governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, WHO, FAO and other partners co-organized in Milan, Italy, the Global Nutrition Summit, building on past events under the *Nutrition for Growth* initiative. The Summit took stock of nutrition commitments made to date and announced additional commitments to accelerate the global response to end malnutrition in all its forms. The G7 Health Ministers' communiqué recognized the new policy and financial commitments made by the Milan Global Nutrition Summit and advocated for food systems to support healthy and sustainable diets in the context of the Decade.

71. In June 2017, at the Stockholm Food Forum convened by the EAT Foundation, over 500 leaders from science, politics, business and civil society exchanged ideas on how to shift food systems towards sustainability, health, security and equity within the boundaries of our planet. In October 2017, the EAT Foundation also hosted its first Asia-Pacific regional meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia. At both events, plenary sessions focused on and profiled the Decade.

2. *Reports*

72. The Decade's objectives and merits have been highlighted in several reports and publications, some of which are outlined below.

73. *Panorama of Food and Nutrition Security in Latin America and the Caribbean 2016*,[42] jointly published by FAO and PAHO as an ICN2 follow-up activity linked to the Decade, reported that obesity affects 23 per cent of the region's population and that around 58 per cent of its inhabitants are overweight, and called for coordinated policies and actions to address obesity in the region. The ensuing edition, *Panorama of Food and Nutrition Security in Latin America and the Caribbean 2017*,[43] found that undernourishment in the region increased by 6 per cent of the population, or 2.4 million people, which would not allow the region to end hunger and malnutrition by 2030 if this trend continues.

74. Coinciding with the start of the Decade, *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in Europe and Central Asia 2017*,[44] published by FAO, provided an in-depth analysis and found that 14.3 million people were still experiencing severe food insecurity in terms of access to food in the region. Malnutrition — undernutrition, overweight and micronutrient deficiencies — was also present to varying degrees in all countries of the region, with 172 million adults being obese, women being at greater risk of malnutrition than men, and high rates of child undernutrition and obesity.

75. In 2016 the *Global Nutrition Report*[45] underlined the relevance of ICN2 commitments and recommendations especially in giving prominence to the issue of food systems. The 2017 edition of the *Global Nutrition Report*,[46] noting that action on nutrition is needed to achieve the SDGs and that action throughout the SDGs is needed to address the causes of malnutrition, called for building connections across the SDG system to ensure that the Decade becomes one of "transformative impact" through SMART nutrition commitments. The NCD Progress Monitor reports in 2017 on 10 national progress indicators including unhealthy diet reduction measures to promote accountability.

[42] http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6977e.pdf.
[43] http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7914e.pdf.
[44] http://www.fao.org/3/a-i8194e.pdf.
[45] http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/130354/filename/130565.pdf.
[46] https://www.globalnutritionreport.org/files/2017/11/Report_2017.pdf.

76. The 2017 edition of *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World*[47] marks a new era in monitoring progress made towards achieving a world without hunger and malnutrition, within the framework of the SDGs and the Decade. The report will henceforth monitor progress towards the targets of ending both hunger and all forms of malnutrition, with enhanced metrics for quantifying and assessing hunger and malnutrition, including two indicators on food insecurity and six indicators on nutrition.

77. Two reports of the Secretary-General on *Agriculture development, food security and nutrition*, submitted to the General Assembly in 2016[48] and 2017,[49] formulated a set of recommendations on optimizing the role of agriculture in ensuring food security and improving nutrition in connection with SDG2 and the Decade.

78. In August 2016, the Global Panel on Agriculture and Food Systems for Nutrition formulated *recommendations to improve nutrition through agriculture and food systems*,[50] which explicitly refer to ICN2 and the Decade.

3. Recommendations and resolutions

79. In May 2017, the 70th WHA welcomed resolution 70/259 and requested the Director-General of WHO to work with the Director-General of FAO to support its Member States, in developing, strengthening and implementing their policies, programmes and plans to address the multiple challenges of malnutrition, and to convene meetings to share best practices, including consideration of SMART commitments within the framework of the Decade.[51] The 70th WHA also approved the updated Appendix 3 of the Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs 2013–2020 that provides guidance on the most cost-effective interventions to address unhealthy diets. Furthermore, an implementation plan on ending childhood obesity was approved.

80. In July 2017 the FAO Conference welcomed the proclamation of the Decade and encouraged FAO to further support its Members in fully achieving the global nutrition targets. It also acknowledged the development of the Decade's Work Programme.

81. Recommendations with a view to respecting, protecting and fulfilling the right to adequate food and nutrition were put forward by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food in her reports transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly in 2016[52] and 2017.[53] In this context, the Special Rapporteur underlined that the Decade "presents a unique opportunity to ensure a coherent, inclusive and transparent response to malnutrition, embedded within human rights".

82. In connection with the Decade, the General Assembly adopted resolutions linked to nutrition in 2016 and 2017: (i) two resolutions encouraged Members and stakeholders to give due consideration to agriculture development, food security and nutrition while implementing the internationally agreed development goals, including the SDGs and ICN2 commitments;[54] and (ii) two resolutions reaffirmed the right of everyone to have access to safe, sufficient and nutritious food, while recognizing in this regard the importance of the global nutrition targets and the nutrition-related

[47] http://www.fao.org/3/a-17695e.pdf.
[48] A/71/283.
[49] A/72/303.
[50] http://glopan.org/sites/default/files/ForesightReport.pdf.
[51] WHA69.8 — http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA69/A69_R8-en.pdf.
[52] A/71/282.
[53] A/72/188.
[54] A/RES/71/245 and A/RES/72/173.

SDGs.[55] Resolution 72/238, in particular, acknowledged the efforts made by Members and UN agencies that have already announced their commitments to the Decade, and encouraged all relevant stakeholders to actively support the Decade's implementation, including by making commitments and establishing action networks.

VI. Conclusion and way forward

83. Efforts to implement the Decade have been actively pursued. To this effect, a Work Programme for the Decade was developed through an inclusive and collaborative process. While global nutrition targets are yet to be fully achieved, some progress has been made in the implementation of national commitments. Almost all countries have policies related to nutrition, often covering all forms of malnutrition. However, nutrition is not always a stated objective in national sectoral policies or development plans. Intersectoral coordination mechanisms have been established to achieve coherent nutrition objectives and targets, often including multiple stakeholders. In general terms, implementation has to be scaled up, investments for nutrition need to be increased, enhanced policy coherence is required, and, most importantly, a greater number of SMART commitments is called for.

84. Countries may consider engaging in policy measures in which experience has been built but implementation is not yet at scale, particularly in regard to: the action area of food systems, the elimination of trans fatty acids from food products; the action area of health systems, the increased coverage of treatment for severe acute malnutrition, the quality of care in health facilities for the promotion, protection and support of breastfeeding; the action area of social protection, the adaptation of social support systems to facilitate access to healthy diets; the action area of trade and investment, the targeting of public investments, infrastructure development and agricultural subsidies, to improve diet quality; the action area of supportive environments for nutrition, the provision of nutritious food in all public institutions; the action area of governance, the engagement of senior country leadership to guarantee an adequate level of commitment.

85. Given the successful experience of the Global Nutrition Summit in Milan in 2017, as part of the Nutrition for Growth initiative, WHO and FAO will work with the Japanese government for a new convening in 2020.

86. The Decade provides the opportunity to invite more actors, beyond the traditional nutrition actors, to engage in nutrition. Notable contributions can be made by city networks in particular. However, adequate forms and opportunities for the private sector have not yet been identified.

87. Additional connections need to be sought with communities acting on women's and children's health, human rights, water and those dealing with climate change. Synergies will be established with the International Decade of Action "Water for Sustainable Development" 2018–2028 and the UN Decade of Family Farming 2019–2028 (A/RES/72/239). Further synergies will be established with the 3rd High-level Meeting on NCDs in 2018 and with the High-level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage in 2019. Such broadened scope of partnerships call for innovative, effective and nimble forms of governance, still avoiding new structures.

88. At country level, intersectoral coordination mechanisms have been established to achieve coherent nutrition objectives and targets, often including multiple stakeholders. Still, good models of collaboration with all stakeholders and adequate rules of engagement need to be worked out and promoted.

[55] A/RES/71/191 and A/RES/72/238.

89. The Decade and ICN2 call for increasing investments: donor funding for nutrition is primarily focused on undernutrition. The World Bank estimates that current yearly spending on nutrition-specific interventions to address stunting, severe acute malnutrition, exclusive breastfeeding, and women's anaemia is USD 2.9 billion from government sources and USD 1 billion from donors. To fully achieve the WHA targets, an additional USD 7 billion per year should be spent in the next 10 years. All governments need to consider their specific investments to address different forms of malnutrition and the impact of their investments in different sectors on nutrition.

90. An analysis of the quality and ambition of commitments made by Members, the UN system and other stakeholders is needed, including of the processes for their development, implementation and reporting, and for holding to account different actors. Greater clarity on accountability mechanisms is needed, as well as synergies with existing mechanisms for SDGs reporting.

91. As foreseen in the Decade's Work Programme, open and inclusive dialogues among all stakeholders to evaluate further progress in implementing the Decade need to be convened at mid-term (2020–21) and at the end (2025) of the Decade. Members will be consulted as to the format and modalities of these reviews.

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Letter dated 29 March 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to submit herewith the Declaration of the Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan: Peace Process, Security Cooperation and Regional Connectivity, adopted at the international conference in Uzbekistan on 27 March 2018 (see annex).

We would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 39, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mahmoud **Saikal**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Bakhtiyor **Ibragimov**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uzbekistan
to the United Nations

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Annex to the letter dated 29 March 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration of the Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan: Peace Process, Security Cooperation and Regional Connectivity

(Tashkent, 26–27 March 2018)

Preamble

We the participants of the Tashkent Conference:

(1) Acknowledge that peace and security in Afghanistan are essential for ensuring stability and prosperity in the region and bringing an end to the many years of violence and suffering of the Afghan people. Therefore, we recognize that a political settlement that is Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, supported by close regional counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics cooperation, and regional economic cooperation and connectivity are key to the peace and prosperity of Afghanistan and the entire region;

(2) Reiterate our support to Resolutions and the decisions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council including on the new partnership formed between Afghanistan and Central Asia following the UN Security Council meeting on Central Asia and Afghanistan held on 19 January 2018 in New York;

(3) Respect sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan and the efforts of its people and government for bringing peace, stability and development to their country;

(4) Recognize the importance of international and regional initiatives to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan that is Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, in particular the Kabul Process, as a main forum and vehicle under the leadership of the Afghan Government to lead peace efforts to end violence in Afghanistan;

(5) Support Central Asian states' efforts toward advancing the peace process and socio-economic development of Afghanistan, and their involvement in regional political and economic processes;

(6) Emphasize the importance of the Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan: Peace Process, Security Cooperation and Regional Connectivity as a continuation of the international community's efforts in support of Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process;

Peace & Reconciliation

(7) Voice our strong backing for the National Unity Government's offer to launch direct talks with the Taliban, without any preconditions, with the ultimate goal of reaching the comprehensive peace agreement with the Taliban that is backed by the international community; and call upon the Taliban to accept this offer for a peace process that is Afghan-led and Afghan-owned and in accordance with the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations;

(8) Emphasize that a political settlement with the Taliban is the best way to end violence in Afghanistan, and there is need for direct peace talks between the Government of Afghanistan and reconcilable elements of the Taliban without any preconditions;

(9) Reiterate our support to the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to begin direct talks with the Taliban and acknowledge the Kabul Process as a main forum and vehicle along with other regional and international peace initiatives on Afghanistan;

(10) Call on the Taliban to recognize their share of responsibility for bringing peace and security to Afghanistan in order to end the suffering of the Afghan people and officially declare their willingness for entering into direct peace talks with the Government of Afghanistan with full support from the international community through a mutually agreed format;

(11) Urge the Afghan Government and the Taliban to move towards a political settlement. An inclusive peace agreement will be a victory for all its parties and a defeat for none. It should guarantee the inclusion of the Taliban in the political process as a legitimate political actor, the renunciation by the Taliban of violence and breaking of all ties to international terrorism, including Al-Qaeda, ISIS/Daesh and other Transnational Terrorist Networks (TTNs), as well as the respect of the Afghan Constitution including the equal rights of all Afghans;

(12) Stress the importance of women's full and meaningful participation in Afghan reconciliation, security and economy, pledge continued support for international efforts aimed at Afghan women's empowerment, and remain fully committed to support the implementation of the Afghanistan's National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security;

(13) Support the Government of Afghanistan in creating favourable conditions for the start and progress of the peace talks through provision of effective incentives and oppose with necessary measures those who prove themselves irreconcilable to peace, continue to commit violence, bloodshed and atrocities and provide assistance to TTNs;

(14) Call on all countries to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and non-interference in its internal affairs in order to achieve its security, stability and prosperity;

(15) Pledge our support for a peaceful Afghanistan from where terrorism will not be able to threaten other countries and which can fully rely on its own forces in creating security on its territory;

Counter-Terrorism & Counter-Narcotics

(16) Condemn the recent heinous attacks against the people of Afghanistan and express our strong solidarity, denounce terrorism in all its forms and manifestations without any distinction and acknowledge the serious and common threats emanating from the nexus between trans-national terrorism, narcotics and organized crime to the security and stability of Afghanistan, the region and the international community at large;

(17) Emphasize the importance of practical regional and international cooperation for the elimination of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations in accordance with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant UNSC resolutions;

(18) Stress the importance of intensified practical efforts by the Government of Afghanistan in cooperation with regional and international partners to address drug production and trafficking, precursor and weapons smuggling as a main source of financing terrorism;

(19) Recognize that terrorism, narcotics and organized crime are interlinked global threats and require a common strategy based on the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy;

(20) Affirm that all security assistance to Afghanistan should be provided through the Afghan Government and strongly oppose any provision of financial support, material assistance or arms to the Taliban and ISIS/Daesh, which only serves to destabilize Afghanistan and prolong the conflict;

Regional Economic Cooperation

(21) Support the recent progress in regional economic cooperation and connectivity projects that recognize Afghanistan as a natural land-bridge connecting Central Asia with South Asia and the wider region. Economic integration of Afghanistan in the region will further contribute to lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and the wider region;

(22) Stress that the timely implementation of regional trade-transit, transport, energy, infrastructure, communication projects connecting Afghanistan to its immediate neighbourhood and the wider region will provide tangible benefit to the people of the region, as a whole, improve livelihoods, and reinforce ongoing efforts to promote peace and combat terrorism and illicit activities;

(23) Acknowledge that, drawing on the previous initiatives, the Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan: Peace Process, Security Cooperation & Regional Connectivity provided a unique opportunity for open and comprehensive discussions on a wide range of issues regarding the Afghan peace process, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics efforts, regional economic cooperation and stimulated the elaboration of mutually agreed solutions;

(24) Express deep gratitude to the Government of Uzbekistan for the traditional hospitality and excellent organization of the high-level Conference in Tashkent, as well as the determined efforts to establish a broad and firm regional and international consensus on the issues of peace, security and regional connectivity.

This declaration was adopted in Tashkent, Republic of Uzbekistan, by Afghanistan, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, EU and UN.

United Nations A/72/831–S/2018/336

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Identical letters dated 6 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I draw your attention to the following:

Israel is continuing its ongoing series of violations of Lebanese sovereignty and of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). On 31 March 2018, Israel violated Lebanese airspace, using an unmanned aerial vehicle armed with four missiles. It subsequently sent a second aerial vehicle to bomb the first aerial vehicle and the site where the latter had crashed on the outskirts of the town of Bayt Yahun in the Bint Jubayl district. A Lebanese Army technical team detonated the four missiles.

Lebanon condemns this dangerous Israeli violation in the strongest possible terms. The international community has repeatedly expressed its condemnation of daily Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace. Such condemnations have been included, inter alia, in the Secretary-General's successive reports on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). However, this latest violation goes beyond merely demonstrating Israel's continued disregard for the will of the international community and recognized international resolutions. It also represents a dangerous escalation. Having systematically used unmanned aerial vehicles for the purposes of surveillance and spying, Israel has now decided to use unmanned aerial vehicles armed with weapons and missiles.

This development is extremely dangerous. It calls for a resolute position to be taken by the Security Council, and places on the international community a responsibility to do whatever is necessary to put a complete and immediate end to these violations. In that regard, Lebanon reiterates that it will stand by its legitimate right to defend its sovereignty — and its land, airspace and waters — in the face of any Israeli aggression.

Lebanon reiterates that it is in full compliance with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). It reiterates its condemnation of these ongoing, systematic Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, which reflect the pursuit by Israel of a policy of flagrant disregard for the provisions of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant internationally recognized resolutions. Lebanon takes this opportunity to yet again convey its request to the Security Council — and through the

Security Council to the entire international community — to apply the necessary effective pressure on Israel to cease its violations, comply with resolution 1701 (2006) in its entirety and implement all the provisions thereof without delay. The continued violation by Israel of international laws and resolutions constitutes a clear threat to regional and international security and peace.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amal **Mudallali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/72/832–S/2018/342

General Assembly
Security Council

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17 April 2018
English
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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Identical letters dated 10 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that, on 9 April 2018, four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Juniyah and proceeding east to the city of Baalbek, in order to conduct raids in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Lebanon strongly condemns this fresh violation of its airspace, which constitutes yet another flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon and Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). My country calls upon the Security Council to condemn this hostile action in the strongest possible terms and take all measures needed to deter Israel from continuing to commit serious violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon by land, sea and air.

On more than one occasion, Lebanon has conveyed to the Security Council its protests and condemnation of the ongoing violations of Lebanese airspace that Israel commits systematically and on a daily basis, and drawn the attention of the Council to the threat that such violations pose to regional and international security and peace. It did so most recently in the identical letters dated 6 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General and President of the Security Council (A/72/831–S/2018/336). Lebanon has also warned the Council that the repeated violation of its airspace by Israel to conduct raids in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic poses a particular threat. It voiced those warnings most recently in the identical letters dated 30 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (A/72/553–S/2017/915) and the identical letters dated 8 February 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (A/72/742–S/2018/109). My country once again strongly condemns and rejects the violation of its airspace by Israel under any circumstances, including for the purpose of attacking Syria.

Lebanon will never cease to call upon the Security Council, and through the Council the international community, to apply the forceful pressure needed to make

Israel halt is acts of aggression and comply with and implement fully and without delay all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006). The continued violation of Lebanese airspace, occupation of Lebanese territory and commission of acts of aggression by Israel constitute a blatant violation of international law and internationally authoritative resolutions, and threaten regional and international security and peace.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amal **Mudallali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/72/833–S/2018/348

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 29
Report of the Security Council

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 12 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 22 March 2018 from Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda, in reference to the summit of the troop-contributing countries to the African Union Mission in Somalia, held on 2 March 2018 at Munyonyo, Kampala, and its final communiqué.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 29, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Adonia **Ayebare**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-06638 (E) 270418

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Annex to the letter dated 12 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Letter dated 22 March 2018 from the President of the Republic of Uganda addressed to the Secretary-General

As you are aware, on 2 March 2018 I convened a summit of Heads of State and Government of troop-contributing countries to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Kampala.

The summit was convened in the wake of the challenges AMISOM is facing, which are characterized by a mismatch between the ideals of the Mission and its resources, and following the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 2372 (2017) in August 2017, in which it called for the phased reduction and drawdown of AMISOM troops.

The summit was attended by representatives of troop-contributing countries, Somalia, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union. AMISOM troop-contributing countries also held a meeting with representatives of regional and international partners. The outcome of the meeting was a final communiqué (available from https://igad.int/attachments/article/1765/030318-communique-tc-somalia.pdf).

Against many odds, AMISOM, working side by side with the Somalia National Army, has made significant strides in fulfilling its mandate. I commend the United Nations and your leadership in particular for the support given to stabilizing Somalia; however, more needs to be done to address the acute level of need in the country.

The region is counting on your continued support to ensure that the necessary steps are taken to consolidate the gains made in Somalia already.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) Yoweri Kaguta **Museveni**
President of the Republic of Uganda

18-06635

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Identical letters dated 14 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

At 0355 hours on Saturday, 14 April 2018, in a flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the provisions and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, the United States, Britain and France carried out a treacherous and brazen attack against the Syrian Arab Republic when they launched approximately 110 missiles at the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, including the capital Damascus and other Syrian cities and areas.

In response to this unjust attack, the Syrian Arab Republic exercised its legitimate right of self-defence to repulse the criminal aggression. Syrian air defence systems were activated against the missiles of this tripartite attack. However, some of the incoming missiles managed to hit a building that is part of the Scientific Research Centre in the Barzah neighbourhood of the capital Damascus and which houses an education centre and scientific laboratories. Losses were restricted to material damages. Missiles aimed at a military site near the city of Homs had their trajectories diverted. The explosion of one of those missiles resulted in injury to three civilians.

The Syrian Arab Republic condemns the tripartite United States, British and French attack against it in the strongest possible terms. The attack yet again demonstrates what can only be explained as a reckless disregard for international legitimacy on the part of those States, even as they blather on about international legitimacy repeatedly and dishonestly. It demonstrates that those States believe only in the law of the jungle and the logic of power, even as they occupy permanent seats on the body to which the Member States of the United Nations have entrusted primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the prevention and suppression of acts of aggression in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Organization's Charter.

This attack by these arrogant hegemonic Western regimes stems from the frustration felt by those States and their clients in the region in the wake of the failure of their conspiratorial enterprise directed against Syria. It comes in response to the defeat of the terrorist groups who are those regimes' proxies in the wake of the

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progress being achieved by the Syrian Arab Army in eastern Ghutah and other parts of Syrian territory.

This attack was timed to coincide with the arrival in Syria of a fact-finding mission from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). That mission is coming to Syria at the request of the Syrian State, which will be greatly facilitating its work as it investigates the alleged chemical attack in Duma. The missile attack was intended to undermine, pre-empt and pressure that mission in an attempt to provide cover for the lies and fabrications of the regimes that perpetrated the attack and prevent them from being exposed.

The Syrian Arab Republic calls on the international community and the Security Council to resolutely condemn this attack, which will only inflame tensions in the region and the world, and which constitutes a threat to overall international peace and security.

This brutal and treacherous attack has been met with high morale on the part of the Syrian people, who have come out into the streets and public squares to condemn it. The attack will have no effect whatsoever on the resolve and determination of the Syrian people and their courageous Army to hunt down the remnants of takfirist terrorism and the remaining gangs of foreign terrorist fighters until all parts of the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic are liberated; to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Syria; and to restore security and stability to all corners of the country.

I should be grateful if this letter could be issued as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/72/835–S/2018/361

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda items 35 and 40

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 16 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey herewith the records of ceasefire violations by the Republic of Armenia in February and March 2018 (see annexes I and II).*

During the two months of the reporting period, the armed forces of Armenia violated the ceasefire regime 3,477 and 3,115 times, respectively, and continued to use large-calibre guns and heavy weaponry from their positions in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

As can be seen from the attached information, the armed forces of Armenia deliberately heighten tensions on the ground to challenge the prospects of lasting peace. Such a strategy stands in stark contrast to the norms and principles of international law and the international commitments of Armenia, and undermines the ongoing efforts towards a political settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

Despite the Security Council's demand, in its resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993), for the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenia has continued to violate the principle of territorial integrity for over 25 years. The military occupation of the territory of Azerbaijan does not represent a solution and will never produce an outcome desired by Armenia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35 and 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

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Annex I to the letter dated 16 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for February 2018*

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damage*
1–28 February	**Aghdam district, Azerbaijan**			
	Afatly village	AK	11	
	Ahmadali village	AK	20	
	Ahmadaghali village	AK	52	
	Ayag Garvand village	AK	12	
	Bash Garvand village	AK	3	
	Chamanly village	AK/DShK	85	
	Chiragly village	AK/AKM	70	
	Evoghlu village	AK	2	
	Garadaghli village	AK	9	
	Mammadbaghirly village	AK	39	
	Mirashilly village	AK/AKM	41	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM/DShK	120	
	Orta Garvand	AK	55	
	Saryjaly village	AK	3	
	Yuzbashily village	AK/AKM	4	
	Zangishaly village	AK	13	
	Aghjabadi district, Azerbaijan			
	Gyamaddynly village	AK	125	
	Minakhorlu village	AK	33	
	Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan			
	Alkhanchally village	AKM/DShK	14	
	Tazakand village	AKM	8	
	Zivilyan village	AKM	30	
	Opposite positions	AK	1	
	Fizuli district, Azerbaijan			
	Ashaghy Abdurrahmanli village	AK/AKM	88	
	Alkhanly village	AK	43	
	Horadiz village	AK	108	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	479	
	Shukurbayli village	AKM	58	
	Gazakh district, Azerbaijan			
	Ashaghi Askipara village	AKM	2	
	Bala Jafarli village	AK/AKM	23	

Abbreviations: AK, Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM, modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK, heavy machine gun; OSV, semi-automatic sniper rifle.

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damage*
	Farahli village	AK/AKM/DShK	40	
	Jafarli village	AKM	12	
	Gaymagly village	AKM/DShK	36	
	Gosha village	DShK	2	
	Gushchu Ayrim village	AKM/DShK	45	
	Gyzylhajili village	AK/AKM/DShK	42	
	Kamarli village	AK/AKM/DShK	51	
	Kohna Gyshlag village	AK/AKM/DShK	14	
	Mazam village	AK/DShK	7	
	Musakoy village	AKM/DShK	33	
	Shikhly village	AKM	2	
	Unnamed heights	AK/AKM	67	
	Gedebey district, Azerbaijan			
	Garavallar village	AKM	8	
	Dordlar village	AKM/DShK	5	
	Galakand village	AKM	10	
	Gasimaghali village	AKM	17	
	Goyali village	AKM	23	
	Mutudara village	AKM	58	
	Novoivanovka village	AK/AKM/DShK	15	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	34	
	Zamanly village	AKM/DShK	29	
	Goranboy district, Azerbaijan			
	Balligaya village	AKM	11	
	Gargujag village	AKM	5	
	Gulustan village	AKM	45	
	Kharkhaput village	AKM	5	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	19	
	Tapgaragoyunlu village	AK/AKM	78	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	9	
	Unnamed positions	AKM	46	
	Yenikand village	AKM/DShK	19	
	Yukhari Agjakend village	AKM	4	
	Zeyva village	AKM	6	
	Goygol district, Azerbaijan			
	Azgilli	AKM	2	
	Kurdalylar village	AK/AKM	27	
	Pirverdilar village	AKM	10	
	Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan			
	Ahmadalilar village	AK	20	
	Jojug Marjanli village	AK	45	
	Lala Ilahi heights	AK	68	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	27	

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damage*
	Khojavand district, Azerbaijan			
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	231	
	Tartar district, Azerbaijan			
	Borsunlu village	AK/AKM	47	
	Chayly village	AK/AKM	13	
	Damirchilar village	AK	27	
	Gapanli village	AK/AKM	64	
	Gazyan village	AK/AKM	45	
	Hasangaya village	AK/AKM/OSV	106	
	Jamilly village	AK	6	
	Karmiravan village	AK	20	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM/DShK	138	
	Tazakand village	AK/AKM	22	
	Tovuz district, Azerbaijan			
	Aghdam village	AK/AKM	71	
	Aghbulag village	AKM	3	
	Alibayli village	AKM	9	
	Asryk Jirdakhan village	AKM	4	
	Garalar village	AK/AKM	7	
	Kokhanaby village	AKM	52	
	Munjuglu village	AK/AKM	17	
	Opposite positions	AKM	4	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	44	

Annex II to the letter dated 16 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for March 2018*

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damage*
1–31 March	**Aghdam district, Azerbaijan**			
	Afatly village	AK	2	
	Ahmadali village	AK	9	
	Ahmadaghali village	AK	36	
	Ayag Garvand village	AK	33	
	Chamanly village	AK	48	
	Chiragly village	AK/AKM	32	
	Evoghlu village	AK	2	
	Garadaghli village	AK	16	
	Javahirli village	AKM/60 mm M	4	
	Mahrizli village	AK	4	
	Mammadbaghirly village	AK	10	
	Mirashilly village	AK/AKM	18	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	135	
	Orta Garvand	AK	45	
	Saryjaly village	AK/AKM	21	
	Shahvalilar village	AKM	3	
	Shikhlar village	AK/AKM	12	
	Unnamed heights	AK	2	
	Yuzbashly village	AK	13	
	Zangishaly village	AK	25	
	Aghjabadi district, Azerbaijan			
	Gyamaddynly village	AK/AKM	109	
	Minakhorlu village	AK/AKM	44	
	Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan			
	Aghjingilli village	AK	1	
	Zivilyan village	AKM	1	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	3	
	Fizuli district, Azerbaijan			
	Ashaghy Abdurrahmanli village	AK/AKM	102	
	Alkhanly village	AK/AKM	36	
	Garagantapa mountain	AK	22	
	Horadiz village	AK	43	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	394	

Abbreviations: AK, Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM, modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK, heavy machine gun; SVD, sniper rifle; 60mm/82mm M, mortar.

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damage*
	Shukurbayli village	AK/AKM	58	
	Gazakh district, Azerbaijan			
	Ashaghi Askipara village	AKM/DShK	5	
	Bala Jafarli village	AK/AKM	27	
	Dashsalahli village	AKM	1	
	Farahli village	AK/AKM	14	
	Jafarli village	AK/AKM	15	
	Gaymagly village	AKM/DShK	31	
	Gushchu Ayrim village	AK/AKM	49	
	Gyzylhajili village	AK/AKM	27	
	Kamarli village	AK/AKM/DShK	34	
	Kohna Gyshlag village	AKM/DShK	3	
	Mazam village	AKM	4	
	Musakoy village	AKM/DShK	17	
	Unnamed heights	AKM/DShK	7	
	Gedebey district, Azerbaijan			
	Ayrivang village	AKM	4	
	Galakand village	AKM	5	
	Goyali village	AKM/DShK	8	
	Mutudara village	AKM	18	
	Novoivanovka village	AKM	3	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	11	
	Zamanly village	AKM	7	
	Goranboy district, Azerbaijan			
	Balligaya village	AKM/DShK	3	
	Gargujag village	AKM	18	
	Girmizisaggallar village	AK	3	
	Gulustan village	AK/AKM	47	
	Kharkhaput village	AK/AKM	16	
	Meshali village	AKM/DShK	16	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	64	
	Tapgaragoyunlu village	AK/AKM/DShK	97	
	Unnamed heights	AK	4	
	Unnamed positions	AKM	43	
	Yenikand village	AK/AKM/DShK	40	
	Yukhari Agjakend village	AKM	15	
	Zeyva village	AK/AKM	43	
	Goygol district, Azerbaijan			
	Kurdalylar village	AKM/SVD	19	
	Pirverdilar village	AKM	1	
	Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan			
	Ahmadalilar village	AK	11	
	Jojug Marjanli village	AK/AKM	42	

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damage*
	Lala Ilahi heights	AK	69	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	6	
	Khojavand district, Azerbaijan			
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	216	
	Unnamed heights	AK	14	
	Tartar district, Azerbaijan			
	Borsunlu village	AK/AKM	65	
	Chayly village	AK/AKM	65	
	Damirchilar village	AK/AKM	47	
	Gapanli village	AK/AKM	70	
	Gazyan village	AK/AKM	86	
	Hasangaya village	AK/AKM/DShK	74	
	Husanli village	AK	6	
	Jamilly village	AK	24	
	Karmiravan village	AK/AKM	13	
	Namirli village	AK	4	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	115	
	Seyidimli village	AK/AKM	3	
	Tazakand village	AK/AKM	57	
	Tovuz district, Azerbaijan			
	Aghdam village	AK/AKM/DShK	32	
	Aghbulag village	AK/AKM	33	
	Alibayli village	AKM	8	
	Asryk Jirdakhan village	AKM	1	
	Garalar village	AK/AKM	5	
	Kokhanaby village	AK/AKM	15	
	Munjuglu village	AK/AKM	22	
	Opposite positions	AKM	1	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	11	

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Agenda items 35 and 40

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 17 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to submit for your attention a statement by the Press Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the anniversary of the occupation of the Kalbajar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the April escalation of 2016 (see annex).*

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35 and 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

18-06371 (E) 240418

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Annex to the letter dated 17 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the Press Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the anniversary of the occupation of the Kalbajar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the April escalation of 2016

On April 2, 1993 the Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan was occupied by armed forces of Armenia as a part of its systematic policy of aggression and occupation against Azerbaijan. Kalbajar, which is located beyond administrative boundaries of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) of Azerbaijan, was occupied as a result of offensive operation mainly carried out from the territory of Armenia by use of heavy weaponry, Mi–24 helicopter gunships and advanced fixed wing aircraft.

As a result of occupation, around 60.000 inhabitants of Kalbajar were subjected to ethnic cleansing and expelled from their native lands, 511 innocent civilians were killed, 321 persons were taken hostage or went missing. Currently, more than 70.000 Kalbajar residents are temporarily residing in different regions of Azerbaijan as internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Private property of Kalbajar inhabitants was plundered and destroyed. Along with the administrative centre of the Kalbajar district, around 150 villages, dozens of historical-cultural monuments, one museum, Istisu sanatorium, more than 110 libraries, around 100 schools, 9 kindergarten and hospitals were razed to the ground by the armed forces of Armenia.

Serious damage was inflicted on rich historical-cultural heritage of Kalbajar. The Museum of History in the Kalbajar district with its unique collection of ancient coins, ancient cemetery, Albanian cloister and churches in Vang village, Lech castle, Ulukhan castle, Galaboynu castle, Mosques in Kalbajar district and in the villages, Taglidash bridge, Cultural House named after Ashig Shamshir and other historical monuments were destroyed by the armed forces of Armenia.

The original architectural features of the Ganjasar and Khudavank cloisters, belonging to the ancient Albanian Christian heritage of Azerbaijan and having no connection with the Armenian Church, were changed and incorporated into the Armenian Church.

Amidst the ongoing military occupation, natural mineral resources of Kalbajar is subject to illegal exploitation. Since 2002, Base Metals CJSC, which is a wholly owned by subsidiary of the Armenia's Vallex Group CJSC, registered in Liechtenstein, has been exploiting Gyzylbulag underground copper-gold mine near Heyvaly village in the Kalbajar district. Predatory exploitation of that mine led to its almost complete depletion. Since 2007, GPM Gold, a subsidiary of GeoProMining Ltd., has been extracting ore in Soyudlu gold mine. As a result of predatory and illegal exploitation of mineral resources of Kalbajar serious damage has been inflicted on the environment.

The construction of the Vardenis-Aghdara highway through the occupied Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan is directly linked to gaining access to the areas in the occupied territories rich in natural resources and to facilitate extracting goods and minerals out of the occupied territories to Armenia and international markets.

Importing minerals, including gold extracted from the occupied Kalbajar and other regions of Azerbaijan by some western countries without due diligence is a matter of serious concern.

Armenia, in blatant violation of the international humanitarian law, transfers settlers of Armenian origin to the occupied territories, including the Kalbajar district, with a view to changing demographic and ethno-cultural features of these territories, which has also been documented by OSCE fact-finding mission.

In response to the occupation of the Kalbajar district, the President of the United Nations Security Council issued statement on 6 April 1993 on behalf of the Council reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region. Following the Presidential Statement United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 822, which reaffirmed "the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory" and "demanded immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kalbajar district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan".

Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 822 (1993), the CSCE Minsk Group, composed of nine countries, worked out the "timetable of urgent steps" to implement the resolution. Instead of withdrawing its armed forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan as demanded by UNSCR, Armenia continued its aggression and occupied Agdam, Jabrayil, Gubadly, Fizuli and Zangilan regions of Azerbaijan in 1993. In response, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993) demanding immediate complete and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

In his report to the President of the Security Council dated 27 July 1993, the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference, Mr. Mario Raffaelli, emphasized that the Armenian side had disregarded Security Council demands, launched an attack, seized new territories in Azerbaijan and challenged the mediation efforts towards a settlement.

Armenia until now continues to disregard the implementation demands of UNSCRs.

Escalation of situation along the line of contact on 2 April 2016 as the result of attacks by the armed forces of Armenia on settlements densely populated Azerbaijani civilians with heavy weapons once again demonstrated that the illegal presence of armed forces of Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan remains major threat to regional peace and security. In response to the attacks of Armenia, the armed forces of Azerbaijan have taken counter measures, which resulted in providing security for the Azerbaijani civilians residing in close vicinity of the line of contact through liberation of strategically important territories and heights from occupation.

Armenia has to understand that occupation of Azerbaijan's lands, including Kalbajar district is temporary. The only way to achieve a durable and lasting settlement is to ensure the unconditional and complete withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the exercise by the forcibly displaced persons of their inalienable right to return to their places of origin in safety and dignity. The Armenian side, instead of wasting time and misleading its own people and the international community, must cease its policy of annexation and ethnic cleansing, and comply with its international obligations and to engage constructively in the conflict settlement process.

All responsibility lies with Armenia for the maintenance of status quo of occupation.

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The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Identical letters dated 3 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of February 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amal **Mudallali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-06313 (E) 230418 250418

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Annex to the identical letters dated 3 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations committed in February 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 February	1630	On the outskirts of the town of Kafr Shuba inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, a Merkava tank left the Israeli enemy's Ruwaysat al-Alam position and approached observation point OP5 of the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The tank crossed the line of withdrawal (the portion of the Blue Line to which a claim is maintained in that area) by some 150 metres and positioned itself there for approximately 15 minutes. The tank then returned to the aforementioned position.
7 February	1230	Between points BP2 and BP6 in Labbunah, UNIFIL forces found a suspicious object and four anti-personnel mines. At 1540 hours, a group of Lebanese Army engineers discovered eight anti-personnel mines previously laid by the Israeli enemy and a smoke grenade (with Hebrew writing on it) previously launched by the enemy that had landed inside Lebanese territory.
9 February	1415	The Israeli enemy released some 20 blue and white balloons from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Ra's al-Naqurah in Lebanese territory.
10 February	0850 0900	Warning sirens were heard along the border between Lebanon and occupied Palestine. Explosions were heard inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
11 February	1230	Opposite the town of Kafr Killa, an Israeli enemy soldier mounted a video camera at point B83 and pointed it in the direction of the aforementioned town.
14 February	1555	From inside occupied Palestinian territory opposite the town of Alma al-Sha'b and point BP4, Israeli enemy soldiers pointed their weapons towards a Lebanese Army observation point.
	1600	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Hula, near the Shaykh Abbad position, the Israeli enemy pointed a camera mounted on a Hummer vehicle in the direction of Lebanese territory. At 1815 hours, the Israeli enemy dismantled the camera.
18 February	1940	Explosions were heard inside the occupied Shab'a Farms between the Zabdin and Ramta posts.
19 February	1715 1740	Explosions were heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
20 February	1740 1930	Explosions were heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
22 February	1510	From its position at Ra's al-Naqurah, Israeli enemy soldiers pointed their personal weapons at Lebanese Army soldiers stationed inside Lebanese territory.
26 February	1725 1925	Five explosions were heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.

Sea violations committed in February 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 February	1110	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011 for a period of one hour and 40 minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 400 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1117	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of one hour and 33 minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 290 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
2 February	0445	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of eight minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 203 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0530	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of 13 minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 407 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1153	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of seven minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 185 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1800	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch trained a searchlight on a Lebanese fishing vessel located inside Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period. Enemy personnel shouted "go north!" in Arabic over loudspeakers and sounded warning sirens for a one-minute period. The same launch again directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	1800	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a five-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 380 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1814 hours, it violated the boundary again for a six-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 410 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
3 February	0925	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 203 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1705	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1809 hours, it violated the boundary again for a 12-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
		Palestinian territorial waters. At 1845 hours, the launch violated the boundary a third time for a seven-minute period and proceeded on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1800	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 380 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1814	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a six-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 410 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1835	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	1847	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch trained a searchlight on a Lebanese fishing vessel located in Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
4 February	0151	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a nine-minute period.
	0355	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a 30-minute period.
	0523	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a seven-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 270 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0530	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period and broadcast over loudspeakers in Arabic.
	1858	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 12-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 350 metres, directing a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a four-minute period. A crew member talking over a loudspeaker directed insults and threats in Arabic at a Lebanese fishing vessel located in Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1907	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
6 February	0231	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 14-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 465 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0257 hours, it violated the boundary again for a 19-minute period and proceeded on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0255	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crews of two Israeli enemy military launches directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a three-minute period.
	0303	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crews of two Israeli enemy military launches directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a four-minute period.
8 February	0028	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0928	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 19-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 277 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1705 1720	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed several rounds of gunfire towards Lebanese territorial waters.
9 February	1859	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of two minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 225 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
10 February	0523	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of seven minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 410 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0530	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of four minutes.
	0538	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period. The crew of that launch also released a percussion bomb in occupied Palestinian territorial waters and sounded warning sirens for 30 seconds.
11 February	1659	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
14 February	1622	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1836	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a nine-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2027	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch trained a searchlight on a Lebanese fishing vessel located in Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period. The crew of that launch spoke in Arabic and sounded a warning siren.
15 February	0233	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters and sounded warning sirens for a two-minute period.
	0240	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
	0247	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	0249	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a five-minute period, broadcast over loudspeakers in Arabic and sounded warning sirens.
	0259	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	0305	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a three-minute period.
	0310	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters and sounded warning sirens for a seven-minute period.
	0355	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0400	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a five-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0445 hours, it violated the boundary again for a 10-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 407 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
		Palestinian territorial waters. At 0500 hours, it violated the boundary a third time for a five-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0507 hours, it returned and violated the boundary a fourth time for a 20-minute period, proceeding some 388 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0610 hours, it violated the boundary a fifth time for a 17-minute period and proceeded on its way for some 390 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0733 hours, it violated the boundary a sixth time for a 20-minute period and proceeded on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0405	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a 15-minute period. The crew of that launch broadcast over loudspeakers in Arabic, directing insults at a Lebanese fishing vessel located inside Lebanese territorial waters.
	0410	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0445	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters and sounded warning sirens for a 57-minute period.
16 February	0525	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0733	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 30-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0750 hours, it violated the boundary again for a 10-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
19 February	0533	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of one hour and 32 minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 592 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1629	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 275 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
20 February	0154	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period. The crew of that launch broadcast over loudspeakers in Arabic, directing threats and insults at a Lebanese fishing vessel located inside Lebanese territorial waters.
	0157	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a 10-minute period.
	0233	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period. The crew of that launch broadcast over loudspeakers in Arabic, directing threats and insults at a Lebanese fishing vessel located inside Lebanese territorial waters.
	0233	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 100 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0457 hours, it violated the boundary again and released an explosive charge in Lebanese waters. At 0700 hours, it violated the boundary a third time for a 20-minute period and proceeded on its way for some 100 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0237	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
	0410	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 160 minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 444 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0457	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch released an explosive charge in Lebanese territorial waters.
	0514	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
	0515	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 15-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 408 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0535	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0545	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 20-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 408 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0713	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 26-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
21 February	2235	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a five-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 222 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
22 February	0705	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a six-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 315 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1645	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 165 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
23 February	0251	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
	0300	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds and released an explosive charge in Lebanese territorial waters.
	0300 0510	The crew of an Israeli enemy military launch released nine explosive charges in Lebanese territorial waters and fired a flare over the second buoy.
	0305	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of 14 minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 205 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0330	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0450	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
	0456	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0500	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a nine-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 592 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0510	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 40 seconds.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0513	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a nine-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 315 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0530	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a 15-minute period.
	0602	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 21-minute period of, and proceeded on its way for some 410 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1020	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, a blue balloon released from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters violated Lebanese territorial waters.
	1630	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 277 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
24 February	0217	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a 23-minute period. The crew of the launch broadcast over loudspeakers in Arabic.
	0245	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
	0249	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a nine-minute period.
	0353	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of two hours and seven minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 555 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0515 hours, it violated the boundary again for a 23-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 590 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0608 hours, it violated the boundary a third time for a 10-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 460 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0635 hours, it violated the boundary a fourth time for a 39-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0740 hours, it violated the boundary for a fifth time for a 12-minute period and proceeded on its way for some 315 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0432	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	0440	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a 12-minute period.
	0500	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a six-minute period and sounded warning sirens.
	0512	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a 14-minute period and sounded warning sirens.
	0520	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a seven-minute period, sounded warning sirens and broadcast over loudspeakers in Hebrew.
	0533	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a 13-minute period and broadcast over loudspeakers in Hebrew.
	0705	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 55-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 100 metres. The enemy launch sounded warning sirens, and its crew members directed insults in Arabic at a Lebanese fishing vessel located in Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1714	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a five-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 280 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
25 February	0432	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 48-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 480 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0523 hours, it violated the boundary again for a 29-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 610 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0440	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a three-minute period.
	0455	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a seven-minute period.
	0555	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a three-minute period.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0734	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 21-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1525	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a five-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 300 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
26 February	0432	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of two hours and 47 minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 410 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
27 February	2038	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
28 February	0505	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 25-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 405 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0543 hours, the launch violated the boundary again for a 24-minute period and proceeded on its way for some 405 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0610 hours, it violated the boundary a third time for a 20-minute period and proceeded on its way for some 425 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1058	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a four-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 280 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations committed in February 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 February	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and the South before leaving at 1625 hours over Aytarun.
2 February	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Zahlah before leaving at 1055 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0915	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh and heading north. They left at 0930 hours over the sea off Tripoli, heading towards Turkey.
	1005	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1030 hours over Aytarun.
	1345	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1840 hours over Rumaysh.
3 February	1430	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Beirut and heading southeast. They left at 1445 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 2120 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
4 February	0930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1055 hours over Rumaysh.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1110 hours over Yarun.
	1440	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Shuf before leaving at 1710 hours over Rumaysh.
	1520	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1630 hours over Rumaysh.
5 February	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Zahlah, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 1510 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1900 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1045	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1130 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
6 February	1335	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1440 hours over Yarun.
	1530	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2220 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0345 hours on 7 February over Alma al-Sha'b.
7 February	0755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1025 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1035 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1210	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over the South before leaving at 1305 hours over Rumaysh.
	1615	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Aytarun.
	1725	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1920 hours over Rumaysh.
	1835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0235 hours on 8 February over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1005 hours on 8 February over Kafr Killa.
8 February	0920	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1540 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0935	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1115 hours over Rumaysh.
	2040	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0705 hours on 9 February over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
9 February	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1530 hours over Rumaysh.
	0830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2000 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1415	The Israeli enemy released some 20 blue and white balloons from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Ra's al-Naqurah in Lebanese territory.
	2010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0615 hours on 10 February over Alma al-Sha'b.
10 February	0530	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Damur. They proceeded as far as the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0545 hours over the sea off Tyre.
	0830	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafra, Shuhayn and Zayqayn. They released several decoy flares, causing a fire between the towns of Shuhayn and Zayqayn.
	0845	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Tyre. They proceeded as far as Kafr Shuba before disappearing from radar screens at 0854 hours.
	0848	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over the South before leaving at 0945 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2050 hours over Rumaysh.
	0920	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Arz. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0940 hours over Sarafand, heading for the sea.
	1125	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It proceeded as far as Tyre before leaving at 1140 hours over Naqurah.
	1240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1640 hours over Naqurah.
	1245	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1440 hours over Rumaysh.
	1300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1920 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1310	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1450 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1405	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at hours on 11 February over Rumaysh.
	1855	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at hours over Rumaysh.
11 February	0150	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
13 February	1530	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over sea off Naqurah. They circled between Shikka and Naqurah before leav 1605 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1620	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over sea off Naqurah. They circled over the sea between Batrun and Naqurah before leaving at 1715 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 212 hours over Yarun.
14 February	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Zahlah, Matn, Ba'abda and South before leaving at 1755 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1040	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over sea off Naqurah. They circled between Shikka and Naqurah before leav 1110 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1120	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over sea off Naqurah. They circled over the sea between Batrun and Naqura before leaving at 1250 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1520	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Baalbek and Riyaq before leav 2030 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1530	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over the South and Batrun before leaving at 16 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving a hours over Rumaysh.
15 February	0735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Zahlah, Matn and Ba'abda bef leaving at 1045 over Naqurah.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Zahlah, Matn, Ba'abda and the South before leaving at 1600 hours over Rumaysh.
	0945	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah and heading northeast. They left at 0955 hours over the sea west of Jubayl.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda, Baalbek, Hirmil, Jubayl, Kasrawan, Matn and the South before leaving at 1945 hours over Rumaysh.
	1025	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the sea between Batrun and Naqurah before leaving at 1125 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1550	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2000 hours over Rumaysh.
16 February	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1055 hours over Rumaysh.
	1020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, the Shuf, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1700 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1210	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2000 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
18 February	0825	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2105 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1740	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over the sea between Shikka and Naqurah before leaving at 1910 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
19 February	0120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1425 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1520 hours over Rumaysh.
	1405	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, the Western Bekaa, Riyaqand the Kasrawanand Matn districts before leaving at 1950 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1435	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Sidon. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Riyaq and Zahlah before leaving at 1825 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1630	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. They proceeded north as far as the sea west of Shikka before leaving at 1640 hours over the sea west of Shikka.
	1647	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka and heading southeast. They left at 1657 hours over Aytarun.
	1700	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They proceeded north as far as Beirut before leaving at 1710 hours over the sea off Beirut.
	1743	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Sidon. They proceeded southeast as far as Naqurah before leaving at 1748 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	2000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0130 hours on 20 February over Naqurah.
20 February	0245	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1430 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Zahlah, the Western Bekaa, Matn, Ba'abda and the South before leaving at 2015 hours over Rumaysh.
	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 1150 hours over the sea off Shikka.
	1205	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over the South and Shikka before leaving at 1310 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
21 February	0020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0245 hours over Rumaysh.
	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and the Shuf before leaving at 1550 hours over Aytarun.
22 February	1035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1320 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1625 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1400	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1515 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1550	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0040 hours on 23 February over Rumaysh.
	1640	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2120 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0055 hours on 23 February over Kafr Killa.
23 February	0045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0630 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the North before leaving at 1350 hours over Naqurah.
	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1320 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1210	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 2120 hours over Rumaysh.
	1220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It proceeded as far as Alma al-Sha'b before leaving at 1230 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
24 February	0830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Zahlah before leaving at 1605 hours over Rumaysh.
	1220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Rumaysh.
26 February	0830	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 0930 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1210	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2240 over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1415	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 1515 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
27 February	0510	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1010 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1225	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Zahlah, Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Arz before leaving at 1610 hours over Rumaysh.
	1420	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. They circled over Iqlim al-Kharrub and the South before leaving at 1510 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1450	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2225 hours over Rumaysh.
	1515	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Baalbek and Riyaq before leaving at 0120 hours on 28 February over Kafr Killa.
	2215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0710 hours on 28 February over Alma al-Sha'b.
28 February	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1325 hours over Rumaysh.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0615 hours on 1 March over Rumaysh.
	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Shuf, the South, Ba'abda and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1230 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1250	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0110 hours on 1 March over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1730	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1900 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

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Agenda item 149
Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Updated financial position of closed peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2017

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the updated financial position of closed peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2017 (A/72/649). During its consideration of the report, the Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses on 13 April 2018.

2. The Advisory Committee recalls the proposals of the Secretary-General to settle outstanding liabilities in closed missions (see A/66/665, A/67/739, A/68/666, A/69/659, A/70/552 and A/71/652). The comments of the Committee on those proposals are contained in the following reports: A/66/713 and A/66/713/Corr.1 (see paras. 10–12); A/67/837 (see paras. 5 and 6); A/68/837 (see paras. 11 and 16); A/69/827 (see paras. 15–17); A/70/829 (see paras. 14–17); and A/71/856 (see paras. 2–3).

3. **The Advisory Committee notes that the General Assembly decided, most recently in its decision 71/546 C, to defer consideration of all six previous reports of the Secretary-General and the related reports of the Advisory Committee until the second part of its resumed seventy-second session. In this context, the Committee reiterates its previous observations and recommendations on the proposals contained in the above-mentioned reports of the Secretary-General.**

4. In his report, the Secretary-General provides background information on the updated financial position of 29 closed peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2017 (A/72/649, paras. 1–4). The report reflects no change in the number of peacekeeping missions that have closed since the issuance of the previous report of the Secretary-General (A/71/652).

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5. The Secretary-General indicates that five of the closed peacekeeping missions had net cash deficits totalling $86,041,000 because of outstanding assessed contributions, and the remaining 24 closed missions had net cash surpluses totalling $85,347,000 available for credit to Member States (A/72/649, paras. 5–17). Upon request, the Advisory Committee was informed that the cash available for credit to Member States from the 24 closed missions in surplus had increased to $103,351,000 as at 31 March 2018, reflecting a reimbursement of $27,000,000 in loans from active peacekeeping missions, $6,872,000 in contributions from Member States, $1,493,000 in investment and other revenue and $39,000 in death and disability claims and other payments, offset by $17,400,000 in loans to active missions (the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)).

6. **The Advisory Committee notes the improved cash position of the closed peacekeeping missions with cash surpluses and reiterates the expectation that cash surpluses available for credit to Member States will be returned in full and in a timely manner (see A/69/827, para. 6; A/70/829, para. 7; and A/71/856, para. 6).**

II. Outstanding amounts due to Member States from closed missions

7. In his report, the Secretary-General provides information about the net cash available for credit to Member States as at 30 June 2017 and about accounts payable to Member States and other liabilities (see A/72/649, annex I). Upon request, the Advisory Committee was provided with an update on outstanding claims owed to troop-contributing countries as at 31 March 2018. According to the information provided, outstanding claims for payment to 27 troop-contributing countries in all closed missions amounted to $81,353,000.

8. **The Advisory Committee reiterates the importance of settling claims by troop- and police-contributing countries of closed peacekeeping missions in a timely manner.**

III. Cash requirements of the Organization

9. The Advisory Committee recalls that the General Assembly, in its resolutions on the financing of peacekeeping operations, has emphasized that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions (see, most recently, A/71/856, para. 9). At the same time, the Committee acknowledges that, because the Assembly has been silent on the mechanism for dealing with the disposition of cash balances available in the accounts of closed peacekeeping missions, the Secretary-General, since 2003, has annually proposed to the Assembly that such cash balances be retained as a source of cross-borrowing for other missions to address the issue of cash shortages in active missions owing to unpaid assessments (ibid.).

10. The Advisory Committee has repeatedly expressed concern about the continued reliance on cash surpluses in closed peacekeeping missions for the cash requirements of active peacekeeping missions and reiterated the importance of delinking the cash flow requirements of active peacekeeping missions from the cash surpluses in closed missions that should be returned to Member States (see A/67/837, para. 8, and A/70/829, para. 11). In this connection, the Committee notes the request by the

Secretary-General to retain a cash balance of $85,347,000 if no new mechanism is approved to address the cash requirements of active peacekeeping operations.

11. The Secretary-General notes that outstanding payments of assessments for 29 closed missions amounted to $399,912,000 gross as at 30 June 2017. Upon request, the Advisory Committee was informed that outstanding assessments totalled $392,634,000 as at 31 March 2018, of which $240,218,000 was outstanding for 24 closed missions in surplus and $152,416,000 for 5 closed missions in deficit. **The Advisory Committee notes the repeated calls by the General Assembly for all Member States to pay their assessed contributions on time, in full and without conditions (see, for example, resolutions 70/271, para. 3; 70/285, para. 1; and 71/856, para. 11).**

12. In his report, the Secretary-General provides an analysis of cross-borrowing by active missions from closed peacekeeping missions, particularly by MINURSO and UNMIK. The Secretary-General indicates that the peak in borrowing over the past three calendar years was $40,000,000 (see annex below). The Advisory Committee notes the overall improvement in the capital structure ratios of peacekeeping missions included in the report of the Board of Auditors (A/72/5 (Vol. II)), which presents the financial performance and cash flows of peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2017 in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards.

13. **The Advisory Committee recalls the steadily declining trend in the peak levels of borrowing by active peacekeeping missions and that the highest level of borrowing in the past three calendar years was $40,000,000. The Committee notes that this reduction in the peak level of borrowing reflects an improvement in the timeliness of the receipt of assessed contributions. In this regard, and in accordance with previous recommendations, the Committee recommends that the net cash balance proposed for retention to cover the temporary borrowing needs of active missions be reduced accordingly to $40,000,000 and that any available cash surplus over that amount be returned to Member States (see para. 14 below).**

IV. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

14. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in paragraph 22 of the report of the Secretary-General. **The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly:**

(a) **Take note of the report of the Secretary-General, subject to its observations and recommendations in the present report;**

(b) **Request the Secretary-General to return to Member States the amount of $63,351,000 out of the balance of $103,351,000 available in 24 closed peacekeeping missions as at 31 March 2018, leaving a balance of $40,000,000 (see para. 12 above).**

15. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the updated balances in the 29 closed peacekeeping operations will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General.**

Annex

Borrowings, settlements and peak levels of cross-borrowing by active missions from closed missions, 1 July 2012 to 31 March 2018

(Millions of United States dollars)

1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013					*1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016*				
Month, year	*Borrowings*	*Settlements*	*Balance*	*Peak level*	*Month, year*	*Borrowings*	*Settlements*	*Balance*	*Peak level*
July 2012	11.0	–	62.0	62.0	July 2015	7.0	–	30.5	30.5
August 2012	–	(8.5)	53.5	62.0	August 2015	–	(3.0)	27.5	30.5
September 2012	–	(6.0)	47.5	47.5	September 2015	–	–	27.5	27.5
October 2012	–	(24.5)	23.0	47.5	October 2015	–	(7.0)	20.5	27.5
November 2012	–	–	23.0	23.0	November 2015	2.0	(3.0)	19.5	22.5
December 2012	14.0	–	37.0	37.0	December 2015	9.0	–	28.5	28.5
January 2013	9.0	(5.0)	41.0	41.0	January 2016	–	–	28.5	28.5
February 2013	–	–	41.0	41.0	February 2016	–	–	28.5	28.5
March 2013	–	–	41.0	41.0	March 2016	–	–	28.5	28.5
April 2013	–	–	41.0	41.0	April 2016	2.0	–	30.5	30.5
May 2013	–	–	41.0	41.0	May 2016	2.0	–	32.5	32.5
June 2013	–	–	41.0	41.0	June 2016	7.5	–	40.0	40.0
1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014					*1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017*				
Month, year	*Borrowings*	*Settlements*	*Balance*	*Peak level*	*Month, year*	*Borrowings*	*Settlements*	*Balance*	*Peak level*
July 2013	11.0	–	52.0	52.0	July 2016	–	(6.0)	34.0	40.0
August 2013	5.0	(13.0)	44.0	57.0	August 2016	–	(8.0)	26.0	34.0
September 2013	–	(4.5)	39.5	44.0	September 2016	–	–	26.0	34.0
October 2013	–	(22.5)	17.0	32.0	October 2016	–	(16.5)	9.5	26.0
November 2013	–	–	17.0	17.0	November 2016	–	–	9.5	9.5
December 2013	–	–	17.0	17.0	December 2016	–	–	9.5	9.5
January 2014	–	–	17.0	17.0	January 2017	–	–	9.5	9.5
February 2014	6.0	–	23.0	23.0	February 2017	4.0	–	13.5	13.5
March 2014	5.0	(6.0)	22.0	28.0	March 2017	3.2	–	16.7	16.7
April 2014	–	–	22.0	22.0	April 2017	5.2	–	21.9	21.9
May 2014	4.0	–	26.0	26.0	May 2017	4.4	–	26.3	26.3
June 2014	5.0	–	31.0	31.0	June 2017	5.8	–	32.1	32.1

1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015					*1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018*				
Month, year	*Borrowings*	*Settlements*	*Balance*	*Peak level*	*Month, year*	*Borrowings*	*Settlements*	*Balance*	*Peak level*
July 2014	6.0	–	37.0	37.0	July 2017	3	–	35.1	35.1
August 2014	6.0	–	43.0	43.0	August 2017	–	–	35.1	35.1
September 2014	–	(11.0)	32.0	43.0	September 2017	–	(24.5)	10.6	35.1
October 2014	–	(27.0)	5.0	32.0	October 2017	–	–	10.6	10.6
November 2014	–	–	5.0	5.0	November 2017	–	–	10.6	10.6
December 2014	–	–	5.0	5.0	December 2017	–	(2.5)	8.1	10.6
January 2015	–	–	5.0	5.0	January 2018	5	–	13.1	13.1
February 2015	6.5	–	11.5	11.5	February 2018	–	–	13.1	13.1
March 2015	–	–	11.5	11.5	March 2018	9.4	–	22.5	22.5
April 2015	3.0	–	14.5	14.5					
May 2015	9.0	–	23.5	23.5					
June 2015	–	–	23.5	23.5					

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Financing of the United Nations Mission in Liberia

Budget performance of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

Appropriation for 2016/17	$187,139,600
Expenditure for 2016/17	$182,846,500
Unencumbered balance for 2016/17	$4,293,100
Appropriation for 2017/18	$110,000,000
Projected expenditure for 2017/18[a]	$109,645,300
Projected underexpenditure for 2017/18[a]	$354,700

[a] Estimates as at 28 February 2018.

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I. Introduction

1. During its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on the budget performance of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 (A/72/640 and A/72/640/Corr.1), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 18 April 2018. The documents reviewed and those used for background information by the Committee are listed at the end of the present report. The comments and recommendations of the Committee on cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations, including those pertaining to the findings and recommendations of the Board of Auditors on the United Nations peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, can be found in its related report (A/72/789). The main observations and recommendations of the Board pertaining specifically to UNMIL are discussed in paragraphs 11 to 15 below.

2. The mandate of UNMIL was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1509 (2003) and extended in subsequent resolutions. The mandate for the reporting period was provided by the Council in its resolutions 2239 (2015), 2308 (2016) and 2333 (2016), in which the Council extended the Mission's mandate for a final period until 30 March 2018 and requested the Secretary-General to complete by 30 April 2018 the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian UNMIL components, other than those required to complete the Mission's liquidation.

II. Budget performance for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017

3. In its resolution 70/278, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of $187,139,600 gross ($180,576,800 net) for the maintenance of UNMIL for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017. Expenditures for the period totalled $182,846,500 gross ($175,500,100 net), reflecting a budget implementation rate of 97.7 per cent, exclusive of budgeted voluntary contributions in kind. The resulting unencumbered balance of $4,293,100, in gross terms, represents 2.3 per cent of the appropriation, reflecting the combined effect of:

(a) Lower-than-budgeted expenditures under: (i) military and police personnel ($3,948,400 or 6.6 per cent) resulting from higher actual vacancy rates; and (ii) operational costs ($12,598,200 or 23.5 per cent) resulting from reduced requirements for air and ground transportation, travel, spare parts, equipment and prefabricated facilities as well as the early decommissioning of a naval vessel;

(b) Higher-than-planned civilian costs ($12,253,500 or 16.7 per cent) resulting from payments due to staff members at the time of separation from service or relocation to another duty station and the promulgation of new salary scales for national General Service staff and National Professional Officers, effective 1 October 2015, which were not anticipated at the time of the preparation of the budget for the 2016/17 period.

4. A detailed analysis of variances is provided in section IV of the report of the Secretary-General on the budget performance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 (A/72/640 and A/72/640/Corr.1).

5. The report of the Secretary-General indicates that, during the 2016/17 period, a total amount of $12,274,500 was redeployed from group I, military and police personnel, and group III, operational costs, to group II, civilian personnel, primarily

to meet the additional costs related to payments resulting from staff members' separation from service or relocation because of the overall Mission drawdown (see also para. 7 below).

6. The Advisory Committee notes that additional expenditures were incurred under group I, military and police personnel, for contingent-owned equipment. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that Security Council resolution 2333 (2016) required UNMIL uniformed personnel to be rapidly downsized by 28 February 2017, which resulted in difficulties in arranging transportation for major equipment of such personnel. The Committee was further informed that the shipment of major equipment did not occur until 30 March 2017 and incurred higher-than-planned freight costs.

7. The Advisory Committee also notes the substantial overexpenditure incurred under group II, civilian personnel, mainly for increased requirements attributable to staff separation payments. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that such payments are part of common staff costs, which are planned for by using the average percentage of common staff costs incurred during the previous budget periods, taking into account any changes on salaries and benefits that may occur subsequent to changes in staff regulations and conditions of service. The Committee was further informed that, for a closing or downsizing peacekeeping mission, additional provisions are made using available information on current liabilities against separating staff members as well as projected liabilities that are expected to be accrued during the upcoming budget period, and that UNMIL included a provision in its 2017/18 budget for staff separation payments. **The Committee trusts that, based on the experiences of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and UNMIL, the Organization will assess trends and patterns of expenditure associated with separation costs in a liquidating mission and build upon the lessons learned to ensure that existing and future liabilities against separating staff are properly reflected and justified in future budget proposals (see paras. 12 and 13 below).**

8. The Advisory Committee also notes the higher-than-anticipated expenditures under group III, operational costs, for the rental of premises ($440,800 or 28 per cent), owing to the delayed handover of some premises in the Pan African Plaza building, which prevented the Mission from achieving the savings initially envisaged. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the United Nations Development Programme delayed its relocation to UNMIL headquarters in the Pan African Plaza building, and therefore UNMIL continued to pay the full rental cost.

9. The Advisory Committee observes that actual expenditures diverged significantly from the planned budget. **The Advisory Committee recommends that the Secretariat more closely analyse the costs associated with closing missions to provide a more realistic budgeting methodology for future missions undergoing drawdown and liquidation.**

10. The report of the Secretary-General indicates that the total unencumbered balance for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 was $4,293,100 and the total unliquidated obligations as at 30 June 2017 amounted to $11,779,300. The report also indicates total other revenue in the amount of $6,769,300 from investment revenue ($422,600), other/miscellaneous revenue ($1,737,100) and the cancellation of prior-period obligations ($4,609,600).

Matters pertaining to the report of the Board of Auditors

11. In considering the report of the Secretary-General on the budget performance of UNMIL, the Advisory Committee also had before it the report of the Board of Auditors on the accounts of the United Nations peacekeeping operations for the

financial period ended 30 June 2017 (A/72/5 (Vol. II)) With respect to budget formulation and management, the Board has stressed repeatedly that the Administration should review weaknesses in budget formulation and develop improved principles and methodologies to assist the missions in formulating realistic, consistent and reliable budgets. The Board observed that, in general, while underexpenditures were reduced significantly when compared with the previous financial year, underspending of 5 per cent or more between appropriation and expenditure continued to take place in a number of missions, including UNMIL, as indicated in paragraph 3 (a) above.

12. The Board of Auditors also indicated that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support were conducting an after-action review of each mission's liquidation process to ensure that lessons were learned and best practices were identified and shared with other peacekeeping missions in drawdown or liquidation phases. The Board noted that the after-action review covered four specific areas: (a) human resources separation and check-out; (b) archiving and record management; (c) disposal of assets; and (d) camp closure, with specific attention to environmental initiatives and challenges (see A/72/5 (Vol. II), chap. II, para. 481).

13. The Board of Auditors further indicated that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support were revising the Liquidation Manual regarding the preparation and implementation of efficient and effective liquidation plans (ibid., para. 482). The Board noted that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support were also developing an environmental annex for the Liquidation Manual, which would include the "Guidelines for Environmental Clearance and Handover of Mission Sites of Liquidation" and a template for the handover certificate for sites handed back to the host nation or land owner (ibid., paras. 487–491). **The Advisory Committee trusts that an update on the revisions to the Liquidation Manual will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the Secretary-General's budget performance report.** The Committee makes additional observations and recommendations on the lessons learned from closing peacekeeping operations in its cross-cutting report on peacekeeping operations (A/72/789).

14. With respect to matters related to environmental management, the Board of Auditors observed that contamination of water and soil had taken place below generators and fuel tanks, especially, but not exclusively, in the camps of troop- and police-contributing countries in missions that had been recently liquidated or downsized, such as UNMIL and UNOCI (see A/72/5 (Vol. II), chap. II, para. 429). The Secretary-General notes in paragraph 19 of his report (A/72/640 and A/72/640/Corr.1) that UNMIL ensured adherence to environmental protection policies in its operations and established a green working group to enhance and promote environmentally sound practices within the Mission. The report indicates that closed sites handed over to the Government of Liberia during the performance period had an environmental clearance certificate signed by the representatives of the Mission and thereafter by the Liberian Government's Environmental Protection Agency inspection team responsible for the closure of the camp or site. **The Advisory Committee notes the progress made on environmental management during the performance period and trusts that all future sites to be closed will be handed over in compliance with the guidance issued by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support with respect to environment and waste management, the revised Liquidation Manual, including its environmental annex, and relevant environmental laws and practices of the host government to avoid any environmental impact (see also paras. 29 and 30 below).**

15. With regard to the Mission's ongoing environmental activities, the Board of Auditors recommended that the Administration ensure that administrative stipulations were adhered to and that quarterly meetings of the UNMIL Environmental Committee were held (see A/72/5 (Vol. II), chap. II, paras. 438–440). The Board also recommended that closing and downsizing missions hand over sites with the smallest environmental footprint possible (ibid., para. 479).

16. Further comments of the Advisory Committee on the information presented in the budget performance report of the Secretary-General (A/72/640 and A/72/640/Corr.1) can be found, where relevant, in the discussion of the current period in section III below.

III. Information on performance for the current period

A. Mandate and planned results

17. The Security Council, in its resolution 2333 (2016), extended the mandate of UNMIL for a final period until 30 March 2018 and requested the Secretary-General to complete by 30 April 2018 the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian UNMIL components, other than those required to complete the Mission's liquidation. In the same resolution, the Council also mandated the Mission to support the Government of Liberia with regard to: (a) the protection of civilians; (b) the reform of justice and security institutions; (c) human rights promotion and protection; (d) public information; and (e) the protection of United Nations personnel (see A/72/640, paras. 4 and 5).

18. In his statement provided to the Advisory Committee, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General indicated that UNMIL was on track to complete its mandate in a timely manner by the deadline of 30 March 2018 and noted that, during the first months of 2018, the Mission had been transferring tasks on human rights monitoring, rule of law, national reconciliation and security sector reform to the government, civil society and the United Nations country team. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Mission had successfully completed its mandate as at 30 March 2018.

B. Financial position of the United Nation Mission in Liberia

19. In its resolution 71/304, the General Assembly decided to appropriate to the Special Account for the United Nations Mission in Liberia the amount of $116,954,000 for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, inclusive of $110,000,000 for the maintenance of the Mission, $5,563,000 for the support account for peacekeeping operations and $1,391,000 for the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy.

20. The Advisory Committee was informed that, as at 18 April 2018, a total of $8,015,707,000 had been assessed on Member States in respect of the Mission since its inception. Payments received as at the same date amounted to $7,990,921,500, leaving an outstanding balance of $24,785,500. In that regard, the Committee recalls that the General Assembly has repeatedly urged all Member States to pay their assessed contributions on time, in full and without conditions (see, for example, General Assembly resolution 71/304).

21. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as at 1 March 2018, payments in the amount of $18,235,500 had been made to troop-contributing countries for standard troop reimbursement costs for the period from 1 January to

31 December 2017. The Committee was also informed that for the period from 1 January to 30 September 2017, payments in the amount of $8,938,000 were made for contingent-owned equipment reimbursements, leaving a balance in the amount of $2,075,000 as at 31 December 2017. The Advisory Committee was also informed that, with respect to death and disability compensation since the inception of the Mission, an amount of $5,109,800 had been paid in respect of 144 claims as at 1 March 2018, and 1 claim was pending. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the outstanding claim will be settled expeditiously.**

22. With respect to the current and projected expenditures for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as at 28 February 2018, expenditures for the period amounted to $83,540,200 gross, or 76 per cent of the appropriation. At the end of the current financial period and closure of the mission, the projected total expenditure would amount to $109,645,300 gross, against the appropriation of $110,000,000 gross, leaving a projected underexpenditure of $354,700 gross, or 0.3 per cent.

C. Liquidation activities

23. The Advisory Committee was informed that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General indicated that UNMIL had reviewed the lessons learned and the audit observations of former and currently closing missions, such as UNOCI and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The Committee was also informed upon enquiry that UNMIL had taken note of the audit observations regarding the backlog of unprocessed transactions (travel claims, purchase orders, invoices, staff security services) that had occurred in UNOCI, and had improved coordination with United Nations Headquarters, the United Nations Logistics Base and the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, with a view to ensuring that all required staff from those entities would be engaged in the Mission's liquidation activities at an earlier stage to simplify the handover of activities after 30 June 2018.

24. The Advisory Committee was informed upon enquiry that the Mission was also coordinating with the Peacekeeping Financing Division, the Accounts Division in the Department of Management, the Field Budget and Finance Division of the Department of Field Support and the Regional Service Centre to identify commitments that should be recorded prior to the closure of accounts for UNMIL, with a view to covering all possible liabilities identified during the 2018/19 period. The Advisory Committee was further informed that UNMIL would share lessons learned on its liquidation activities for the benefit of future closing peacekeeping missions.

Education grant

25. The Advisory Committee was informed upon enquiry that education grants for staff members for the 2017/18 school year would be settled against the Mission's approved resources for the 2017/18 period. The Committee was further informed that the Regional Service Centre, which processes education grants for UNMIL, would prorate the amounts based on the day of the staff member's separation. The Advisory Committee recalls information received on the processing of education grants for MINUSTAH, which included in the check-out list for separating staff members a requirement to submit claims for their children's education grants. The Committee was further informed that such claims were prorated according to the period of service of the staff member, in line with paragraph 5.1 under section 5 of the administrative instruction on the education grant and special education grant for children with a disability (see ST/AI/2011/4/Amend.2) for staff who were separated before 1 January 2018, while section 6 of the updated administrative instruction on the education grant

and related benefits (ST/AI/2018/1) would apply to staff separating after 1 January 2018. **The Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to strictly comply with the administrative instructions on the education grant and special education grant for children.**

Unforeseen liabilities

26. In paragraph 65 of his report, the Secretary-General suggests the possibility that unforeseen liabilities might arise after 30 June 2018, as obligations to governments for troops, formed police units, logistical support and other goods supplied and services rendered remain valid for a five-year period. Owing to those unforeseen liabilities, the Secretary-General proposes that the General Assembly allow the Secretary-General, on an exceptional basis, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee and subject to relevant rules and regulations, to enter into commitments in respect of expenditures related to the mandated operation and liquidation of the Mission that are identified after its closure, and to use the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund for cash flow purposes if necessary.

27. **The Advisory Committee trusts that, in line with the recommendations of the Board of Auditors (see A/72/5 (Vol. II), chap. II, para. 473), the Secretariat will in future begin pre-liquidation processes and identify potential outstanding commitments at least nine months before a mission's physical closure, to avoid the use of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund.**

28. **The Advisory Committee trusts that updated financial information on potential outstanding liabilities, including for liabilities under contracts, will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the Secretary-General's final performance report.**

Environmental waste management

29. The Advisory Committee was informed upon enquiry that eight sites were closed during the 2017/18 period and all received UNMIL environmental clearance certificates, which were countersigned by a representative of the Environmental Protection Agency of the Government of Liberia. The Advisory Committee was also informed that clean-up activities were being performed according to environment and waste management policies approved by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, in line with Liberian environmental law. The Committee was further informed that 200 tons of contaminated soil had been collected, of which 30 tons had been treated so far, and a further 300 tons of contaminated soil were expected to be collected before the completion of the liquidation of the Mission. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the Mission will continue to reduce its long-term overall environmental footprint, including by implementing environmentally friendly waste management practices, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolutions 69/307 and 70/286 and as recommended by the Board of Auditors in its report A/72/5 (Vol. II), and treating all 500 tons of contaminated soil, and that lessons learned from the Mission's environmental waste management practices will be incorporated into the revised Liquidation Manual.**

30. The Advisory Committee was also informed, upon enquiry, that the Mission disposed of 201 sea containers in 2017 and planned to dispose of a further 571 sea containers in 2018. The Committee requested, but did not receive, complete information on the time frame for and the environmental waste management procedures that would be applied to the disposal of the sea containers. **The Committee recalls its expectation that unused sea containers, regardless of their condition, will be disposed of properly, either by their removal or by their being discarded without causing environmental**

damage. The Committee also trusts that detailed information on the disposal of the aforementioned sea containers will be included in the final performance report for UNMIL for the period 2017/18 (see A/71/836/Add.16, para. 54).

IV. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

31. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the budget performance report for UNMIL for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 are contained in paragraph 66 of the report of the Secretary-General. **The Advisory Committee recommends that the unencumbered balance of $4,293,100 for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, as well as other revenue and adjustments for the period ended 30 June 2017 in the amount of $6,769,300, be credited to Member States in full and without delay. The Committee also supports the proposal that the Assembly authorize the Secretary-General on an exceptional basis, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee and subject to relevant rules and regulations, to enter into commitments in respect of expenditures related to the mandated operation and liquidation of UNMIL that are identified after the closure of the Mission, to use the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund for cash flow purposes if necessary and to report thereon in the context of the final performance report.**

Documentation

- Report of the Secretary-General on the budget performance of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 (A/72/640 and A/72/640/Corr.1)
- Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the budget performance for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 and proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (A/71/836/Add.16)
- Financial report and audited financial state nts for the 12-month period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 and report of the Board of Auditors, Volume II, United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/72/5 (Vol. II))
- Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on observations and recommendations on cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations (A/72/789)
- General Assembly resolutions 70/278 and 71/304
- Security Council resolutions 2284 (2016) and 2333 (2016)